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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Audit report lag is defined as the length of time from a company's fiscal year-end to the date of 
the auditor’s report (Abernathy, Barnes, Stefaniak, & Weisbarth, 2017; Ashton, Graul, & Newton, 
1989; Habib & Bhuiyan, 2011; Hasan, Hadad, Ahmed, & Hassan, 2016). 
Corporate governance (CG) means the process and structure used to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of a company, towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability, with the ultimate objective of realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking 
account of the interests of other stakeholders (CMA, 2015). 
Corporate governance quality (CGQ) is defined as the ability to possess and meet the common 
corporate governance standards set by the authorities (Lokman, Cotter, & Mula, 2009). 
Earnings quality (EQ) Is defined as the extent to which reported earnings faithfully corresponds 
to the change in net economic assets other than from transactions with owners (Hicks, 1953; 




The purpose of this research is to establish the mediating effect of corporate governance on the 
association between audit report lag and earnings quality. The research aims at addressing two 
main research questions. First, how earnings quality influence audit report lag and second, what 
mediating role does corporate governance quality play on the association between earnings quality 
and audit report lag in non-financial companies listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange? In this 
study, both primary and secondary data were used. The secondary data were obtained from 
companies’ audited annual reports, while a closed-ended research questionnaire was used to collect 
primary data. The data was analyzed in two stages. In the first stage, an association test between 
the audit report lag (which was measured as the number of days from the financial year-end to the 
date of signing the audit report) and earnings quality (which was measured as discretionary 
accruals as per the discretionary accruals model) was carried out. In the second stage, a mediation 
test to examine the mediating effect of corporate governance qualities on the association above 
was conducted. The association test was analyzed based on the significance of the independent 
variables. Although the model was significant, the t-statistic for the discretionary accruals was 
statistically insignificant despite there being a negative correlation between earnings quality and 
audit report lag, which could be interpreted as an increase in the earnings quality leads to a decrease 
audit report lag. For the mediation test, the R-squared, F-statistics and the t-statistics were 
significant. This justifies that there is a mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the 
association between audit report lag and earnings quality. To corroborate these findings from the 
secondary data, the findings from the primary data with valid Cronbach’s Alpha, provided 
additional evidence on the importance of the quality of corporate governance in mediating earning 
quality and audit report lag. While audit report lag can be easily identified, there are still difficulties 
in detecting earnings management. As such, these findings may act as a red flag for detecting 
earnings management in non-financial firms listed on the NSE. This study will be of interest to 
investors in identifying earnings management, regulatory bodies for detecting gaps in reporting 
and policymakers who would set up corporate governance policies to improve companies’ 
management. 





1.1 Background of the Study 
A robust and efficient financial sector requires quality and timely financial reporting. Quality and 
timeliness of financial reporting are key in supporting the decision-making processes of 
stakeholders (Waweru, 2014). To achieve these,, several regulating bodies exist to oversee 
companies financial reporting (Taillord, 2012). These bodies are responsible for overseeing the 
development of codes and guidelines that support quality financial reporting. In Kenya, the Capital 
Markets Authority (CMA) introduced a new code of corporate governance practice for issuers of 
securities to the public in 2015. The code came into effect on March 4, 2017 after being gazetted 
on March 4, 2016. Apart from replacing the guidelines of corporate governance practices by listed 
companies, 2002, the CMA also believes that this code will enhance good corporate governance 
practices CMA, 2017. 
Previously, extensive research has been done on corporate governance quality (CGQ), earnings 
quality, (EQ) and Audit report lag (ARL) (Abernathy et al., 2017; Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013; 
Owino, 2017). Most of the studies either discussed the relationship between corporate governance 
and Earnings quality (Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2015; Outa, Eisenberg, & Ozili, 2017), the 
relationship between corporate governance quality and audit report lag (Afify, 2009b), or linking 
audit report lag to earnings management (Abernathy et al., 2017; Blankley et al., 2015). However, 
there have been no studies that try to link the mediating effect of corporate governance quality to 
the association between audit report lag and earnings quality. Therefore, this study’s intent on 
finding out whether corporate governance quality qualifies to mediate the association between 
earnings quality and audit report lag. To achieve this objective, this study adopted the accrual-
based approach to measure earnings quality, used number of days to measure audit report lag and 
used a single but informative measure developed by Brown (Brown, Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011) 
and used by (Outa et al., 2017) to measure corporate governance quality. The corporate governance 
score was developed based on the corporate governance codes issued in 2002 (Outa et al., 2017). 
1.1.1 Earnings Quality and Audit Report lag  
Quality and reliability of annual financial reporting are  important (Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Ashton 
et al., 1989) as it guarantees that relevant data is conveyed especially to potential speculators with 
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the goal that legitimate venture choices could be made by them (Waweru, 2014). Convenient and 
timely issuance of yearly reports depicts the ability of the organizations to convey data and declare 
their income to investors. In this way, the organization fulfills one of the key purposes of financial 
reporting which is to provide information that is useful for decision making (Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB, 2016). 
During the audit, auditors have a tolerance threshold for audit quality (Asthana, 2014), which 
implies that the auditor is likely not to clear the audit until the minimum threshold on the quality 
of financial reports as set by the auditor is surpassed. In situations where the threshold is not 
obtained, the auditor will put in extra effort to the audit and/or have auditor clients negotiations 
(Salterio, 2012). When either or both situations arise, then it is most likely that the audit report lag 
could be as a result of the earnings quality. 
Assessing earnings quality from the decision usefulness is not possible without assessing the 
timeliness of the earnings reporting. The balancing between timelines and quality has, for  a long 
time, been a key concern for auditors (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2012; Abernathy et al., 2017). 
Earnings quality is defined as the extent to which reported earnings faithfully corresponds to the 
change in net economic assets; other than from transactions with owners (Hicks, 1953; Schipper 
& Vincent, 2003). In this study, earnings quality is used as a proxy for financial reporting quality. 
Audit report lag, which is viewed as the most important determinant for financial reporting 
timelines (Abbott et al., 2012; Givoly & Palmon, 1982), is defined as the length of time from a 
company's fiscal year-end to the date of auditor’s report (Abernathy et al., 2017; Ashton, Robert, 
Graul, & Newton, 1989; Habib & Bhuiyan, 2011; Hassan, 2016). 
1.1.2 Corporate Governance and regulatory provisions in Kenya  
Global concerns over companies’ collapse, such as Enron, are always closely associated with 
corporate governance (Earnest & Sofian, 2013; Ketz, 2003). Kenya is characterized as a 
developing country and an emerging economy with middle–income. Nevertheless, Kenya has 
faced serious concerns over the effectiveness of its regulatory institutions (Tauringana, Kyeyune, 
& Opio, 2011). The fall of Chase Bank and Uchumi supermarket were mostly attributed to weak 
regulatory frameworks in the country financial sector (Holmey, 2016; Mathuva, 2014). With 
continuous hope in the strengthening of the regulatory institutions (Association of Certified Fraud 
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Examiners, 2014; Mathuva, Mboya, & McFie, 2017), the country has made significant steps. They 
include, for example, the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010, the introduction of the new 
Companies Act in 2015 and in the same year the CMA implemented the new corporate governance 
practice for listed companies which superseded the voluntary corporate governance code of 2002. 
The 2015 corporate governance code emphasizes on compulsory disclosure, unlike the repealed 
code that focused on voluntary disclosures leaving gaps that led to doubt on the quality of 
reporting. 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) and CMA both assume an increasingly important role as 
the financial regulators in the Kenyan economy. They are keen on setting regulations and ensuring 
compliance to achieve market efficiency. Market efficiency contributed greatly in attracting capital 
for the Sixty -Six listed companies in the NSE as at 31st December 2017. These companies are 
distributed among twelve sectors. According to the table, the banking sector; commercial and 
service sector and the manufacturing and allied companies take up half of the listed companies. A 
recent study on the association between audit report lag and earnings quality of firms in the United 
States found this relationship to exist and it affects firm value forcing the market to adjust for the 
association when valuing the firm (Asthana, 2014). To back up Asthana’s findings, a study by 
(Darweesh, 2015; Waweru, 2014) proved that corporate governance quality has a positive 
influence on investors’ decisions. These studies provide evidence of the importance of observing 
the audit report lag, how it influences earnings quality and whether corporate governance quality 
could mediate this association. 
Currently, there are debates on whether financial statements can be prepared and audited without 
compromising their quality; especially their reliability (Abernathy et al., 2017; Aktaş & Karǧin, 
2011). Therefore, in light of this literature review coupled with the aim to reduce audit report lag 
so as to manage pressure from stakeholders, it is imperative to study whether practicing quality 
corporate governance by listed non-financial companies in Kenya has any influence on the 
association between the quality of earnings and audit report lag. Based on the purposive sampling 
technique and using both the primary and secondary data, this study seeks to respond to the 
following research question: do companies that have adopted the corporate governance codes 
experience improved earnings quality and a shorter audit report release period? 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The trade-off between quality and timely financial reporting is one of the most discussed topics in 
accounting as well as auditing profession (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Blankley et al., 2015). The 
fact that it is almost impossible to achieve quality at the expense of timeliness in company reporting 
is clear from both audit and accounting research findings (Abdullahi & Abubakar, 2017; Oluoch, 
Muturi, & Florence, 2017). Quality and timely financial reporting characteristics bring out the two 
main qualitative characteristics of accounting information, which are relevance and reliability. 
A review of the literature relating to audit report lag, earnings quality and corporate governance 
provides evidence that earnings management is perceived to contribute to longer audit report lag 
(Blankley et al., 2015), Other researchers  relate audit report lag to its’ ability in shaking investors’ 
confidence. For the latter, a good example is Uchumi supermarket which is listed on the NSE. 
When the audit report for Uchumi took longer than six months to be released, investors withdrew 
their investments claiming that there was bad news being concealed by managers of Uchumi 
(Iraya, Mwangi, &Muchoki, 2015). While for the former, other researchers found that audit delay 
acts as a positive sign where the effectiveness of fraud detection is high (Habib &Bhuiyan, 2011; 
Malsch & Salterio, 2015).  
Inconsistencies in the literature findings on the relationship between earnings quality, corporate 
governance qualities and audit report lag were as a result of the studies focusing on different 
jurisdictions (Chan, Luo, & Mo, 2016; Habib & Bhuiyan, 2011). Studies on corporate governance 
characteristics and audit report lag provide contradicting results when company-specific 
characteristics such as industry and firm size are considered (Habib & Bhuiyan, 2011; 
Kamalluarifin, 2016). Some studies found that a company’s specific characteristic such as the 
industry may be negatively associated with audit report lag when using a longitudinal approach 
but positively related when using a cross-sectional approach as a research method (Henderson & 
Kaplan, 2000; Owino, 2016). These findings further contradict other studies that attempted to 
explain the relationship between corporate governance quality and earnings quality or corporate 
governance quality and audit report lag. From the researchers, literature review studies on the 
mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the association between audit report lag and 
earnings quality are less forthcoming, yet corporate governance quality, audit report lag and 
earnings quality are key concepts that have the potential of affecting securities trading negatively. 
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They may create information asymmetry and or delay trading. With the current growth in the use 
of technology to enhance real-time trading, these delays also build pressure on management from 
investors, auditors and those charged with governance. 
Most investors wait for the report to inform their decision. Delaying the report might make them 
prefer another investment option (Abernathy et al., 2017; Dao & Pham, 2014). In cases where 
audit delays are as a result of the quality of the presented accounts, this will affect the auditors’ 
audit plan and audit process, management performance and potential investor decision-making 
process. As such, earnings quality, audit report lag and corporate governance quality are key 
concepts for investigation (Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Blankley et 
al., 2015). Based on these realities coupled with the inconsistent and inconclusive literature in the 
previous studies, the two create an opportunity and justify the relevance of discussing the 
mediating effect of corporate governance on the association between earnings quality and audit 
report lag. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 General Objective 
The study seeks to investigate the mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the 
association between earnings quality and audit report lag by listed non-financial companies on the 
NSE. 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
This study seeks to address the following specific objectives: 
1. To establish the influence of earnings quality on audit report lag of listed non-financial 
companies on the NSE. 
2. To establish the association between audit report lag and corporate governance quality of 
listed non-financial companies on the NSE. 
3. To obtain views from the preparers and auditors of the annual report of listed non-financial 




1.4 Research Questions 
The study will seek to answer the following research questions: 
1. How does earnings quality influence audit report lag of non-financial companies listed on 
the NSE? 
2. What mediating role does corporate governance quality play on the association between 
earnings quality and audit report lag in non-financial companies listed on the NSE? 
3. Do annual report preparers and auditors of listed non-financial firms perceive an 
association between earnings quality, corporate governance quality and audit report lag? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The findings of this study will be significant in the following ways: 
1.5.1  To Researchers 
This study endeavoured to add to the existing literature in the following three ways. First, by 
contributing to the knowledge on drivers of audit report lag. Second, by discussing the influence 
of earnings quality on the audit report lag and finally, it also examined the mediating effect of 
corporate governance on the association between earnings quality and audit report lag. By adopting 
a mixed method approach, the findings of this study extend the literature on the knowledge of the 
relationship between corporate governance quality, audit report lag, and earnings quality in a 
developing country. It is also hoped that the results of this study will be used by other researchers 
to modify existing theories or support in developing new theories on the variables studied. 
1.5.2  To company managers and auditors 
Knowledge of the relationship between earnings quality and audit report lag is likely to provide 
more insight on the audit quality. The findings of this study will aid the auditor in having a better 
understanding of the influence of earnings quality on audit report lag. This could help the managers 
and auditors plan their audit engagements. 
1.5.3  To Regulators and policymakers   
Regulators play an important role in formulating policies and ensuring that the regulated 
companies adhere to the provided regulations. Knowledge on the moderating effect of corporate 
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governance may inform policymakers such as Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Institute 
of Chartered Public Accountants in Kenya (ICPAK) when formulating the regulatory codes and 
when pushing for compliance. This study also provides information that the regulators may use as 
a red flag to detect non-compliant companies. Effective regulation will encourage efficiency, 
robustness and strengthen the investors’ belief in the market.  
1.5.4  To Investors  
This study seeks to guide investors when choosing their investment preference. Depending on the 
relationship between corporate governance quality, audit report lag and earnings quality, investors 
can be able to decide on which companies to invest in the NSE. Audit report lag may signify poor 
earning quality. Investors may easily notice audit report lag rather than earnings quality when 
making investment decisions. 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
The scope of a study can be discussed in terms of the conceptual scope, organization scope and 
temporal scope (Bell, 2014). The conceptual scope of this study comprised the audit report lag, 
corporate governance quality and earnings quality. The target scope was public listed companies 
in NSE and the temporal scope was the period studied. Further, this study endeavoured to establish 
the influence of earnings quality on audit report lag and discuss the mediating effect of corporate 
governance quality on the association between earnings quality and audit report lag. Kenya 
provided an interesting setting for examining these research questions since the study had not been 
conducted in Kenya before. For instance, there have been relatively new adjustments in Kenya’s 
corporate governance practices since the introduction of the new code in 2015. This study also 
sought responses from the preparers and auditors of annual financial reports to enable the 
researcher to triangulate the results. These respondents were the most relevant because, 
presumably, they understand the study variables better. Their experience and professional 
qualifications were key in validating the questionnaires. The study was limited to non-financial 
companies listed on the NSE from 1st January 2007 to 31st December 2016. This period provided 
an opportunity to observe the variables over a long period of time, therefore, justifying consistency 






This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the associations between audit 
report lag, earnings quality and corporate governance quality. The chapter is divided into six 
sections. The first section analyses the theoretical review; signaling theory, stakeholder’s theory 
and agency theory are all discussed as the theories relevant to audit report lag, corporate 
governance quality and earnings quality. The second section expounds on the empirical review, 
extent literature on the audit report lag, earnings quality and corporate governance quality is 
discussed.  Thirdly a research gap is presented, followed by the conceptual framework and finally 
the chapter summary explains the literature gap which forms the basis of this study. 
2.2 Theoretical Review of Literature on audit report lag, earnings quality and corporate 
governance quality 
2.2.1  Signaling theory 
Signaling theory or Flagging hypothesis as referred to, by other researchers was formulated by 
Spence (1973) and progressed by Watts, Zimmerman and Cliffs (1986) to clarify conduct in labor 
advertisement. The ability of the signaling theory to describe the behavior of two parties who have  
access to two different  information made it applicable to several other research in accounting and 
finance (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2010). Thus, the theory can likewise be utilized to 
clarify the idea of opportune financial reporting. This theory is mainly concerned with removing 
information asymmetry in financial markets. Information asymmetry arises when firms internal 
members have insider information which is not available to the public (Cao & Hui, 2009; 
Lauermann, 2012). 
Information asymmetry can be reduced when the advantaged party signals the disadvantaged party 
with information that is relevant and believable, or when proper regulations exist in the market to 
ensure better access to information. The processes of releasing financial statement or audit reports 
act as a signal to investors. Early release of reports may be viewed as good news to an extent that 
they affect the firm value positively (Cao & Hui, 2009; Givoly & Palmon, 1982). Late release of 
audit report may act as a bad signal towards the possibility that the company is not performing as 
good as the books show. For example, when the audit report for Uchumi Supermarket delayed for 
9 
 
more than six months and investors panicked and withdrew what they could. This was an example 
of what a market can face due to late release of report for a company listed on the NSE. As such, 
directors should be keen on audit report lag, especially when caused by earnings quality and may 
contribute to delayed audit report thus signaling bad information in the market. Other activities 
such as the arrival of reviewed reports, the planning of the arrival of reports, delay of audit report 
might be interpreted by investors as a signal of how the firm is performing. Therefore, signaling 
theory is relevant in the discussions of audit report lag. The study attempts to detect whether audit 
report lag would signal poor earnings quality and whether audit report lag would signal poor 
corporate governance quality. 
2.2.2  Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder assumes a role like that of a bookkeeper with a specific objective of acquiring 
opportune money related data. Whereas some stakeholders may be straining to prepare timely and 
quality financial reports, others may be speculating and watching the performance of the firms. 
Such stakeholders’ behaviors makes it important for the research to study stakeholders’ behaviors. 
Stakeholders theory, being a fundamental concept in management of institutions has been 
discussed in most past studies (Bitsch, Brochstedt, Holm, & Knudsen, 2017; Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). The initial focus of stakeholder theory was on identifying 
the stakeholders, categorizing them into internal and external stakeholders and managing what 
drives and influences the stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2004). In this way the stakeholders were 
viewed as subjects to be managed especially through monitoring. This view has changed; the 
current studies are focusing on aligning stakeholders interest in a way that it creates a  more 
network based and rational view of the institutions stakeholders (Bitsch et al., 2017; Jones & 
Wicks, 1999; Scholl, 2002).  
This theory was developed further into stakeholder networking theory, which focuses on 
stakeholders interdependence, dynamic and mutuality (Timur & Getz, 2008). The Stakeholders 
networking theory advocates for multiple stakeholders moving beyond dyadic ties (Rowley, 1997). 
The connection between stakeholders theory, be it stakeholder theory of cooperation by 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995) or stakeholders networking theory by (Rowley, 1997) are both 
relevant to this study considering how varying interest of stakeholders can affect a company’s 
ability to achieve its’ objectives. 
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The fundamental basis of stakeholder theory is normative approach, which involves acceptance of 
the following two ideas. First that Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interest in 
procedural and substantive aspects of corporate activities; they are identified by their interests and 
whether their corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them. Secondly, that the 
interest of all stakeholders has an intrinsic value, which means that each group of stakeholder 
merits and the company considers not merely to cover the interest of some groups such as share 
owners. The stakeholder’s theory is managerial in terms that it does not simply describe the cause, 
existing situation or predict cost effect relationships. It also involves attitude structure and 
practices which taken together constitute stakeholder’s management. Stakeholder management 
requires at its’ key; attitudes and simultaneous attention to the legitimate interest of all appropriate 
stakeholders both in establishment of organization structures, general policies and in case, by case 
decision making. These requirements holds to anyone managing or effecting corporate policy 
including not only professional managers but shareowners, the government and others (Freeman 
et al., 2004). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) view Stakeholder theory from three aspects; the descriptive 
perspective; that is the accuracy, instrumental perspective; that is its’ power and the normative 
perspective; that is its’ validity. Though descriptive, normative and instrumental perspectives seem 
different from each other they are mutually supportive of each other (Scholl, 2002). When 
stakeholder theory is viewed as descriptive, it presents a model describing what a corporate is, as 
a correlation of competitive and comparative interests possessing intrinsic value. The actions for 
this model may be tested for describing accuracy. Stakeholder theory is instrumental when it 
establishes a framework between stakeholder’s management and achieving of corporate 
performance goals. This framework can be used for examining the connection if any between 
stakeholder management and achievement of various corporate performance goals. This is the 
main connection between stakeholder theory earnings quality and adopting corporate governance 
quality in addressing stakeholder’s conflicts. 
Some studies on stakeholder theory propose that corporates practicing stakeholder management 
through adopting principles such as corporate governance codes, are more likely to be relatively 
successful in conventional performance when compared with companies that do not practice 
stakeholders management  (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004). 
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2.2.3  Agency Theory 
An agency relationship arises where one party (principal) contacts another person (agent) to 
perform a service and gives the agent decision making authority (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Auditors, 
directors and management work on behalf of shareholders and therefore their interconnection may 
create an agency relationship that would lead to agency-principal problems. Agency problems arise 
either when the principal’s and the agent’s goals conflict and or when identifying whether the 
agent has behaved properly (Olson, 2000). Some scholars believe that the theory has an assumption 
that all actions of individuals are motivated by their self-interests. Hence, agent’s self-interests 
oblige the principals to incur monitoring and bonding costs to safe guard their interest. This is the 
positivist approach to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Shapiro, 2005). 
When stakeholders who are bonded by agency contracts have different risk appetites and different 
desires then conflict of interest exists. The principal approach identifies this situation of conflict 
and prescribe governance mechanisms to address the conflicts, for instance, through the 
development of codes such as the corporate governance codes. The link between corporate 
governance quality, earnings quality and agency theory occurs because of the separation between 
managers and owners (Outa et al., 2017). The corporate governance codes can also be viewed as 
an application of a normative theory approach which links to the agency theory. 
Corporate governance codes, auditing/accounting standards, regulatory instructions or ethical 
standards can be conceptualized as normative theories that may be supportive or problematic in  
agency relationships (Malsch & Salterio, 2015). The corporate governance codes may be used in 
research to evaluate the practices of the directors or the regulations can be evaluated considering 
what the directors do. In some cases, both ways are evaluated. Studies on normative theories  argue 
that codes, standards or guidelines may limit the directors to the options permitted in the 
regulations (Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, & Young, 2015). Griffith et al., (2015) argues that the 
regulatory guidance could be the root cause of poorer conduct of audit or audit evidence especially 
when auditors take a safer approach. It is therefore important to study the regulatory theory to 
establish whether the guidelines are relevant and support corporates in achieving their main 
objectives. This leads to conceptualizing on how regulations should be done, develop a baseline 
to evaluate how the codes work, and ensure the guidelines cover to a greater extent the users’ 
requirements. Despite the fact that there are indications that the users are not complying with these 
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regulations (Outa et al., 2017), it is key for a user to conform to the guidelines set by the regulations 
as long as they can help address the organizations’ challenges. Study of the normative theories 
may also lead to suggestions for revision of standards or codes.  
In conclusion, agency theory is key in this study in two ways, first, when considering how 
organizations manage conflicts of interest, the existence of codes such as corporate governance 
codes could help in managing the conflicts. Second, from the normative theory perspective of 
agency theory, corporate governance qualities also set precedence on how to manage performance. 
The second key theory is the stakeholders' theory. For this theory, through ensuring earnings 
quality and practice of quality corporate governance these are some of the ways of ensuring 
stakeholders interest are met. Finally, signaling theory is applicable to this study in that audit report 
lag or companies which do not practice quality corporate governance may be a signal of poor 
earnings quality. 
2.3 Empirical review of extant literature on audit report lag, earnings quality and 
corporate governance quality 
In this section, the literature on audit report lag, earnings quality and corporate governance quality 
shall be reviewed with the objective of discussing the determinants of audit report lag, how audit 
report lag relates to earnings quality and corporate governance quality, the proxies of earnings 
quality, how corporate governance quality can be used to mediate the association between audit 
report lag and earnings quality. Finally, a brief discussion on the control variables will be done. 
2.3.1 Audit report lag 
Stakeholders around the world have emphasized for decades the need for financial reporting 
timeliness. Literature uses other synonyms like audit lag, audit timeliness, abnormal audit delays, 
or financial reporting timeliness for audit report lag. Research on audit report lag were keen on the 
determinants of audit report lag or discussed ways to reduce the audit report lag period started way 
back in the 1970s. The studies were carried out in different countries by different researchers: 
(Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991) study was in New Zealand, (Davies & Whittred, 1980) study was in 
Australia while (Ashton et al., 1989) study was in Canada. All these studies were concerned with 
the delay of the audit report. 
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Some of the key focus in the study of audit report lag are the factors determining audit report lag. 
Earlier investigations have classified drivers of audit report lag as reviewer related components, 
organization related elements and corporate administration related elements (Afify, 2009; 
Eghliaow, 2013; Hassan, 2016). These components,  are distinctive in various nations because of 
the diverse institutional set-up in the distinctive nations (Apadore & Mohd Noor, 2013; K. H. 
Chan, Luo, & Mo, 2016; Hasan et al., 2016). Some of the studies were detailed and were able to 
categories the determinants as ether: company specific factors (Givoly & Palmon, 1982; Owino, 
2017), audit related factors (Ashton et al., 1989; Dao & Pham, 2014) or corporate governance 
factors (Habib, 2015; Hasan et al., 2016; Ilaboya & Christian, 2014; Sultana, Singh, & Van der 
Zahn, 2015). Johnson, Davies, & Freeman, ( 2002) developed a combined model with several 
specific factors to measure abnormal audit delay. When (Asthana, 2014) applied this model to try 
and establish the relationship between abnormal audit delays and  earnings quality in United states 
firms (Asthana, 2014). The model was found to be insignificant with an adjusted r-squared of only 
27%.  
Other studies focused on audit report lag and corporate qualities (Ashton, Robert et al., 1989)  and 
examined the relationship between audit report lag and corporate qualities. They found that, the 
industry (financial or manufacturing), type of audit report (qualified or unqualified), performance 
of the company (loss/profit), nature of the company (listed or private), presence of internal controls 
among other factors as the determinants of audit delays. Their findings were later supported by 
(Carslaw & Kaplan, 1991). Current studies on audit report lag have summarized the factors that 
influence the AR L as Audit related Factors, company related factors and corporate governance 
factors (Hasan et al., 2016; Owino, 2017; Sultana et al., 2015). 
Asthana ( 2014) used an abnormal audit delay model, which was previously used by (Johnson et 
al., 2002) to determine audit report lag. The model result was a 27% adjusted r-squared. When 
compared with the  80% for audit fee model used by other studies (Afify, 2009a). 
2.3.2  Earnings Quality 
Earnings quality has been discussed extensively in  literature and most studies on earnings quality 
focus on three things: how it is defined, what contributes to earnings quality and the drivers of 
earnings quality (Schipper & Vincent, 2003; Hicks, 1953; Salterio, 2012). Hicks,(1953) was 
among the first researchers to discuss what constitutes earnings quality. He defines earnings as 
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what can be consumed ( that is paid out as dividends) during a financial period while at the same 
time the paying firm’s equity at the beginning and at the end of that period remains in a stable 
state. Therefore, according to Hicks earnings quality is the extent to which earnings represent 
Hicksian income. 
When earnings quality is discussed from the point of view of its decision usefulness, especially as 
adopted by (FASB) and by some academic researchers then, it is imperative to link the importance 
of earnings quality and firm’s investment stakeholders and other stakeholders in a contractual 
relationship with the firm. This view of earnings quality also informs contractual arrangements 
such as the debt agreement. Thus, when such arrangements are entered into and the earnings 
quality is not achieved, they may lead to an unintended transfer of wealth. For example, an 
intended overstatement of earning may lead to overpayment of managers and longer audit in cases 
where audit client negotiations have to take place.  
Earnings quality is a key measurement of performance for any profit-making organizations. 
Previous discussions on earnings quality have mostly focused on measuring and validating the 
earnings (Kashmiri, 2014; Schipper& Vincent, 2003). To address objective two in this study, the 
literature on the association between audit report lag and earnings quality is key. One of the most 
recent studies by (Asthana, 2014) found that there exists a negative association between audit 
report lag and earnings quality. The study used the following proxies to measure earnings quality 
(earnings persistence, earnings predictability, discretionary accruals, earnings volatility and 
earnings timeliness). Where persistence covered the extent to which earnings remain in the future 
realization. It is sometimes used as a synonym for suitability. Predictive ability is a function of 
distribution especially the variance of the earnings. 
Asthana's study is among the studies arguing that earnings management is only a section of 
earnings quality and therefore other factors other than earnings management affecting earnings 
quality have to be incorporated to achieve an effective earnings quality (Asthana, 2014; Lo, 2008). 
This is unlike other studies, which measure earnings quality as the absence of earnings 
management. Earnings quality construct may further depend on either the accounting treatments 
(smoothing, discretionary accruals, abnormal accruals) and or the underlying events and 
transactions to measure earnings quality (Barker & Imam, 2008; Schipper & Vincent, 2003).  
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From other previous studies in developed economies by (Asthana, 2014; Malsch & Salterio, 2016; 
Salterio, 2012), it is evident that audit report lag may be caused by the differences in the numbers 
to be reported in the financial statement. This situation often arises when the external independent 
auditor holds a different opinion from the client’s opinion on accounting figures to be disclosed, 
hence discussions between the external auditor and the management would arise that would lead 
to audit delays. When this happens, it is likely to be an indication of poor earnings quality.  
Accounting concepts such as provisions and off-balance sheet financing make it more complicated 
to observe earnings quality from a layman perspective (Asthana, 2014; Balboa, López-Espinosa, 
& Rubia, 2013; Kashmiri, 2014). These concepts are usually left for management judgments with 
limited guidance irrespective of the fact that some grey areas exist when reporting provisions or 
dealings with off-balance sheet transactions (IASB, 2009).  These grey areas contribute to the 
difficulties when measuring earnings management.  
Earnings management can therefore be measured differently. McNichols, (2000) describes three 
different categories with which earnings management can be measured. The approaches are: the 
methodological/special accruals approach, how earnings is distributed after management and the 
aggregate accruals approach. Special accruals methodology is limited by its’ nature in that it 
focuses only on special industry sectors with specials accruals. Therefore, the special accruals 
approach would be more applicable when studying the differences in earnings quality in different 
industries. While the distribution of earnings after management only focuses on the statistical 
approach, the aggregate accruals identifies discretionary accruals based on the ration between total 
assets accruals and hypothesized explanatory factor. The aggregate model, as such, accounts for 
the limitations in the other two models and is therefore purposely selected for this study.  
Given the fact that more than twenty five published papers have looked at the determinants of audit 
report lag. It is important to take a different perspective and discuss how the audit report lag relates 
to other key factors in the organization. In this regard, therefore, the research question on whether 
audit report lag may have been caused by material disagreements between the auditor and the client 
regarding accounting practices and or calculation of accounting numbers may contain information 
about quality of earnings that has not extensively been investigated (Asthana, 2014). Based on the 
discussions above, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
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H1 Earnings quality is negatively associated with audit report lag 
Table 2.1 shows a discussion of the measures and the definition of the variables to be used in in 
the study.  
2.3.4 The mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the association between AR 
and earnings quality 
A mediating variable is a variable that explains how or why such effects occur. Though in some 
studies the mediating and moderating variables may be a bit complex; it is key to note that a 
moderating variable specifies when certain effects will hold. In this case, a moderating variable 
only affects the dependent variable. On the other hand, a mediating variable explains why the 
effect in the relationship between independent and dependent variable as an intervention process 
occur. It is sometimes referred to as intervening variable and therefore affects both the dependent 
and independent variable. In this study corporate governance is discussed as the mediating 
variable; the following paragraphs discuss literature on corporate governance.  
The concept of corporate governance was first introduced in 1999 by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 1999; Waweru, 2014). Since then the 
code has been applied to different companies and realized several benefits such as investors’ 
confidence and their desire to invest more in companies practicing corporate governance increased 
(Waweru, 2014). Earnest & Sofian (2013) state that corporate governance is the cornerstone for 
maintaining and sustaining success in future. The Kenyan corporate governance code 2015 can be 
categorized into two: the principal corporate governance practices and the recommendations of the 
best practices. However, with these two options of practicing corporate governance, corporate 
scandals with the ability to affect firm performance still exist; these scandals particularly in Kenya 
have left some stakeholders questioning the effectiveness of the corporate governance code (Outa 
2016). The scandals have also contributed to the reforms in the capital market which aim to 
improving board operations and control, prioritize shareholders rights while according minority 
shareholders protection and finally ensuring transparency and disclosures of the affairs of the 
company.  
Based on the previous findings and study, researchers seem to place the importance of corporate 
governance at a crossroad denoting that the expectations of the benefits of corporate governance 
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is rivaled by the critics of corporate governance (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Daily et al., 
(2003) defines corporate governance to involve determination of the broad uses of organization 
resources and how conflicts are resolved. These definitions present a different approach to 
corporate governance compared to the previously discussed. Daily et al., (2003)  attempt to link 
corporate governance to organizations where ownership and control are separate and therefore 
focuses on protecting shareholders. This provides a different angle for viewing corporate 
governance. Other studies on corporate governance focus on the company characteristics or the 
specific corporate governance characteristics. 
Previous research on corporate governance tend to focus on the quality of corporate governance  ( 
Chan, Watson, & Woodliff, 2014; Nicoló, Nicol, Ueda, & Laeven, 2006; Zitouni, 2016). These 
studies were mainly backing up to the importance of corporate governance and its’ ability to  
improve investors’ confidence (Chang & Sun, 2009; D. M. Mathuva et al., 2017; (Brown et al., 
2011). Regardless of the slight changes in the corporate governance quality matrix used especially 
when different relationships are being observed, their findings eco the importance of corporate 
governance concluding that investors would wish to pay more for a well-regulated firm. Therefore, 
as the quality of corporate governance increases in a firm, the firm is more likely to be associated 
with firm value increase and equity cost decrease causing investors top refer firms with good 
corporate governance (Waweru, 2014; Darweesh, 2015). 
Apart from increasing firm value and reducing cost of equity, corporate governance has been 
studied in relation to many other variables. For example, Brown et al., (2011) examined corporate 
governance and financial reporting. In Browns study, corporate governance quality proxies were 
the existence of strong and practical laws with the ability to protect investors. He found out that 
countries with such strong laws and regimes tend to have higher quality accounting and reporting, 
which, in turn, attracts new investors and build their confidence. These findings were similar to 
(Darweesh, 2015) finding who examined whether there is a relationship between corporate 
governance, financial performance and market value. 
Studies relating corporate governance quality to audit report lag tend to focus on company’s 
corporate governance specific characteristics such as the audit committee quality characteristics 
(Bamber, Bamber, & Schoderbek, 1993; Apadore 2013). Bamber found that companies with an 
effective audit committee characteristics had less chances of audit report lag than companies with 
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non-functioning audit committees. In Bamber’s study, effective audit committee was characterized 
by the following: presence of an audit committee, composition of the audit committee in that there 
are independent directors, the level of professional expertise of the directors especially in the 
finance sector, number of meetings the committee holds and  the size of the audit committee.  
Different researchers tend to focus on different corporate governance quality attributes, which are 
directly related with the variables they are interested in. Some of the key corporate governance 
effectiveness questions discussed by past researchers are: what is the size of the board? How 
frequent are the board meeting held? What is the proportion of board directors (number of non-
executive director in the board)? Is the audit committee independent and finally; what is the 
composition of professional experts of the audit committee? It may seem obvious, from the 
principles of corporate governance that corporate governance quality moderates earnings quality 
and audit report lag. However, previous studies have conflicting finding on the influence of 
corporate governance on either earnings quality or audit report lag ( Iraya, Mwangi, & Muchoki, 
(2015). 
Studies on the effect of corporate governance characteristics on earnings management found that 
corporate governance characteristics such as ownership concentration, board size, and board 
independence negatively relate to earnings management (Iraya et al., 2015). These findings on 
corporate governance characteristics and its association with earnings quality were similar to the 
findings by (Sáenz González & García-Meca, 2014) study in the northern America. While 
(Waweru, 2014) study on African market found that board size and board independence affect 
earnings management differently. (Iraya et al., 2015) study recommended for quality corporate 
governance though they also found that other corporate governance quality characteristics like 
board activity and CEO duality do not affect earnings quality. 
Based on these findings there are continuous debate on whether the new corporate governance 
code in Kenya is more effective than the voluntary corporate governance code that existed before 
(Outa et al., 2017; Iraya et al., 2015). (Outa et al., 2017) found that the voluntary corporate 
governance code was not effective in constraining earnings management. He further states that 
though the mandatory corporate governance quality in Kenya somehow supported companies in 
reducing earnings management, the voluntary nature of the current corporate governance does not 
allow it to prevent earnings management. Therefore, his study contributes to the debate on the 
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effectiveness of audit report lag by seeking to demonstrate that the new corporate governance code 
would be effective in maintaining earnings quality. Based on the discussions above, on whether 
corporate governance has an association with the audit report lag or earnings quality the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
H2 The association between earnings quality and audit report lag is mediated negatively by 
corporate governance quality. 
2.3.5 The mediating test on the effect of corporate governance quality on audit report lag 
Corporate governance quality is a mediating variable to the extent that it carries the influence of 
earnings quality (Independent variable) to audit report lag (dependent variable). The effect of the 
mediation will be tested  by following (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Baron states that in testing the 
mediation effect the following conditions must be met. First, the study must prove that there is an 
effect to be mediated that is the independence variable (earnings quality) influences the dependent 
variable (audit report lag). Second, the study must treat the mediator as if it was an outcome 
variable; that is, the independent variable earnings quality influences the mediator (CG). Third, 
the mediator (CG) must influence the dependent variable (audit report lag). Finally, the effect of 
the independent variable (earnings quality) on the dependent variable (audit report lag) is 
diminished after controlling for the effect of the mediator. 
If all the above conditions are satisfied, and the influence of the earnings quality on audit report 
lag becomes insignificant in the presence of a corporate governance quality, then the effects of the 
earnings quality are “completely” mediated by corporate governance quality. On the contrary, if 
the influence of the earnings quality remains insignificant in the presence of corporate governance 
quality, then the effect of the independent variable is partially “mediated”. There is no mediating 
effect if any of the above conditions are not satisfied. 
2.4 Summary of the Literature 
Three-key variables in the study have been discussed. Literature has shown evidence on the 
determinants and drivers of audit report lag (Apadore& Mohd Noor, 2013; Chan et al., 2016; Hasan 
et al., 2016) across the continents. These studies identify the determinants and classify them 
according to the rate of influence. (Afify, 2009b; Chan et al., 2016; Knechel & Payne, 2001; 
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Owino, 2016) determined the drivers of audit report lag to establish whether they are determinants 
or drivers. There is extant literature on this perspective of viewing audit report lag. 
In other studies, as discussed in the literature, audit report lag has been related to earnings quality 
(Habib, 2015; Habib & Bhuiyan, 2011). These three studies in different contexts and jurisdictions 
prove that the level of earnings quality affect audit report lag. (Lambert, Jones, Brazel, & 
Showalter, 2017; Messier, Glover, & Prawitt, 2016)  also had similar findings on the relationship 
between the quality of financial statements and audit report lag.  
In the last section, this study reviews literature on corporate governance and how they affect 
earnings quality and audit report lag.  Earlier  studies that focused on this aspect are  (Courtis, 
1976; Hsu, Wang, Tsai, & Lu, 1995; Lokman et al., 2009). These studies were more concerned 
with the quality of financial reporting. Recent studies on corporate governance focus on the 
measures of corporate governance ( Mathuva et al., 2017; Zitouni, 2016). Two current studies have 
discussed the impact of corporate governance quality on earnings quality (Kanagaretnam, Lim, & 
Lobo, 2014; Outa et al., 2017). These studies explain the relationship between the key variable 
from past literature. 
2.5 Research Gap 
The prior research, to a greater extent, has examined the determinants of audit report lag (Apadore 
& Mohd Noor, 2013; Hasan et al., 2016; Owino, 2017). However, the possibility that audit report 
lag may have been caused by material disagreement between the auditors and the client regarding 
accounting practices and/or disagreements resulting from calculation of accounting numbers, 
which may contain information about quality of earning beyond those conveyed by other factors 
has not been investigated in developing economies. In developed countries, for example  the 
United States, (Salterio, 2012) research suggests that positive abnormal audit delay is an indication 
that audit delay took place as a result of audit clients having material disagreements in the 
accounting treatments. 
Asthana 2014 found that there exists an association between audit report lag and earnings quality. 
Asthana study used the following proxies for earnings quality (earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, discretionary accruals, earnings volatility and earnings timeliness) although his 
measure of earnings quality was insignificant. It would be relevant to study this association in a 
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developing country considering the different regulatory framework, economic status and 
jurisdictions.  
In 2015, CMA introduced a new code of corporate governance, with tis code the CMA intend to 
improve the quality of financial reporting, boost investors’ capital and improve the capital base in 
the NSE. This study hopes to inform the regulators and the users of the accounts on whether 
corporate governance as a regulatory requirement is important in boosting investors’ confidence. 
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
The figure below explains the relationship between the variables. The independent variable is 
earnings quality, audit report lag is the dependent variable while corporate governance quality is 
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The relationship between earnings quality and audit report lag may be mediated by corporate 
governance quality. A mediator variable (Corporate governance quality) explains how and why 
the association between audit report lag and earnings quality exist. Corporate governance qualities, 
therefore, may serve as a mediator variable to the extent that it accounts for the relation between 
earnings quality and audit report lag. The mediating effect is a hypothesized causal  chain in which 
one variable affect a second variable that in turn affects a third variable (Prado, Korelo, & Silva, 
2014). The paths between: earnings quality and corporate governance, corporate governance and 
audit report lag and finally between earnings quality and audit report lag represent the direct effects 
while the mediational effect in which earnings quality leads to audit report lag through corporate 
governance is the indirect effect. The indirect effect represents the portion of the relationship 
between earnings quality and audit report lag that is mediated by corporate governance. In the 
above mentioned relationships there are some moderating variables. A moderating variable 
explains how or when certain effects occur. In this study they are: firm size, auditor type, foreign 
ownership, leverage, and industry and audit committee qualities. The operationalization of the 
variables is discussed in table 2.1: variables definition. 
2.6.1 Operationalization of the Variables 
This section describes how the researcher measures the independent, dependents and control 
variables used in the study. The independent variables are earnings quality and corporate 
governance quality while the control variables are: firm size, auditor type, foreign ownership, 
leverage, and industry and audit committee qualities. Table 2.1: variable definition and measures 
provide a summary of how the variables were operationalized.  
Table 2.1: Variables definition 
 




ACQS Measured by the audit 
committee quality index 





(2016)  and 
Zitouni (2016) 
Audit committee 
quality index in 






Audit fees LN- AUDIT FEE The natural log of audit 
fees (Abbott, Parker & 
Peters, 2012) 
(Abbott, Parker 





ARL-NO-DAYS is defined as the length of 
time from a company's 
fiscal year-end to the date 






annual report  and 
data collection 




lag estimated  
ARL ESTIMATED  The error term after 
regressing the ARL 
model on drivers of audit 




annual report  
Auditor type AUDITOR-TYPE A dichotomous variable 
of 1 if audit firm was Big-






Audit risk  AUDIT-RISK The ratio of current assets 











CGQS Measured by the 
corporate governance 














Company size  
Complexity of 
the audit 
COMPLEXITY Measured as ratio of 
inventory and  receivable 








DACC Is calculated as the ratio 
of discretionary accrual to 
total asset at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
The discretionary 











using (Dechow, 1994) as 
















This was the proportion 
of shares owned by 
foreigners 
F.OT Listed company’s 
annual report 








A dummy variable 1 If 
company is in the 
industry being analyzed 





Leverage LEVERAGE Total liabilities to total 
assets (da Silveira Di 
Miceli, Leal, Barros, 
&Carvalhal-da-Silva, 
2009) 







Period DYR Dummy variable for the 
period being studied  
 Listed company’s 
annual report 
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2.7 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has expounded on the empirical and theoretical literature relevant to the study. In the 
theoretical literature, three theories have been discussed; signaling theory, stakeholder’s theory 
and the agency theory. Agency theory is relevant to this study based on the view that the auditors 
and management in many of the organizations are agents working for their principal 
(shareholders). Therefore, agency cost may arise, which leads to supervisory measures like 
ensuring corporate governance quality. Agency and stakeholder’s theory are almost viewed in the 
same way in this study. The fact that auditors, management and directors are different stakeholders 
with different stakeholder’s interest. Once again, practices such as implementing a corporate 
governance code moderates this relationship. Hence the role of corporate governance is key. For 
this reason there are discussions on normative theory briefly at the end of stakeholder’s theory to 
explain the use of regulations and standards to address stakeholder’s differences. Finally signaling 
theory is also relevant to the study, audit delay or poor corporate governance practices may send 
certain wrong signals to the speculating investors. In addition to this, the regulatory authorities 
may also use the audit report lag as a red flag for detecting companies practicing earnings 
management. 
In the empirical literature review section, discussion on audit report lag from the initial audit 
related to audit report lag is presented. Audit report lag is a concept that was first discussed more 
than forty years ago. From the literature review, most past studies on audit report lag focused on 
determinants of audit report lag. Further literature also brings out the need for discussion on how 
the audit report lag can be reduced to an acceptable level, therefore the chapter brings out how 
audit report lag is linked to earnings quality and corporate governance quality. Some studies which 
advocate for this relationships to be discussed were (Abernathy et al., 2017; Asthana, 2014; Owino, 
2017). Abernathy et al., (2017) provided a synthesis of literature from extensive international past 
studies on audit report lag. From his findings one of his main suggestions for future research was 
on studies that would seek solutions for the trade-off between timeliness and quality of reporting. 
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Asthana study in the USA investigated the association between abnormal audit delay and earnings 
quality in the USA. Though the model the study used to determine abnormal audit delay failed the 
significant test, the second model which the study used to measure earnings quality was relevant 
in both Multivariate and univariate regression. Therefore this study adopted a more comprehensive 
methodology with clear stages of data analysis.   
The key articles that informs this study are (Abernathy et al., 2017; Asthana, 2014; Outa et al., 
2017). As discussed above (Abernathy et al., 2017) informed the literature review through giving 
the international perspective of the audit report lag, (Asthana, 2014) informed the methodology 
and (Outa et al., 2017) informed the discussion on the moderating and mediating variables 







This Chapter lays out the methodology used in collecting and analyzing the data with the aim of 
responding to the study objectives. It is divided into eight sections starting with an introduction. 
Section two and three expounds on the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research and 
the research design, respectively. Section three, on the other hand, explains the population and 
sampling methods adopted. This is followed by a discussion on the data collection instruments 
used. Thereafter, the data processing, analysis, and research quality. The last section weighs in on 
ethical considerations. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
An Ontological approach, unlike the epistemological approach, which focuses on what the reality 
is and how to reach it, shows the relationship between concepts or ideas and hence relates more to 
the dynamic of human behavior. It deals with the nature of reality and applies a systematic belief 
that reflects on individual interpretation of what constitutes a fact (Malsch & Salterio, 2015). In 
this regard, this study used an ontological framework to collect, analyze and interpret the data, 
which formed the background of the study, and to interpret what contributes to audit report lag 
using a positive approach. This means that this study considered audit report lag as a social 
observable reality hence the effect of corporate governance quality or earnings quality on audit 
report lag could lead to the review of the corporate governance practices or earnings management 
practices (Creswell, 2013). 
Philosophical ideas are usually hidden in a study (Creswell, 2013a) although they are the ideas 
behind the research discovering hidden assumption in behavioral research and they also help in 
justifying the quality and quantity of the research. The most discussed assumptions are 
interpretivism and the positivism. The former finds it difficult to define what is right or wrong 
while the latter approach gives validity and objectivity to the study. For these reasons, this study 
adopted a positivist approach with the following philosophical premises; the reality is out there, 
that reality can be scientifically measured, there exists causality and determinism (which means 
cause determines effect), and reductionism which means (Ideas are reduced, and theories verified 
using empirical methods. To counteract this philosophy, this study used both primary and 
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secondary data. The secondary data was collected from companies’ websites, annual reports, and 
the CMA websites. The data was keyed in an excel sheet while the primary data was collected 
using the research questionnaire in Appendix ii. The questionnaires were administered to internal 
auditors, external auditors, and accountants of the listed non-financial companies in the study. 
3.3  Research Design 
A research design is a plan of the methods and techniques to be adopted for collection and analysis 
of data required in obtaining answers to research questions (Mugenda, 2003). The choice of a 
research methodology to be used is dependent on the topic of study and the nature and scope of 
the data to be collected (Creswell, 2013; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005).  
Using a panel data approach to analyze the secondary data collected, and corroborating the results 
from the primary data source that were analyzed. The study conducted normality tests for the 
secondary data and reliability test for the primary data to validate the data that was used to the two 
hypotheses and the third research objective. 
3.3.1 Quantitative approach 
Research methodology can be categorized into three broad areas: qualitative, quantitative or the 
mixed method. Creswell, (2013b)) states that all research is both qualitative and quantitative in a 
way. They are all qualitative because even numerical figures can conceal a number of meanings, 
and they are quantitative because all things can be counted. The choice of a research methodology 
used is dependent on the topic of study and the nature and scope of the data collected (Creswell, 
2013; Graham et al., 2005). In order to address the research objectives in chapter one, a quantitative 
approach was used with survey design. Towards this end, both quantitative approach and survey 
design complemented each other, when further matters in relation to the study were explored.  
Graham et al., (2005) states that though large sample empirical analysis provided statistical power 
and cross-sectional variation. The large sample studies suffered from several weaknesses related 
to variable specification and inability to ask qualitative questions. First, large samples cannot 
always speak to the relative importance of competing hypothesis for phenomena because in the 
large sample, the explanatory sample with the least measurement error might dominate in a 
regression analysis (Malsch & Salterio, 2016), while in a qualitative analysis, it is almost possible 
to rate the hypothesis. Secondly, developing good empirical evidence on the association between 
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audit report lag and earning quality and the mediating effect of corporate governance was key for 
this study, therefore survey offered an opportunity to ask listed non-financial companies’ accounts 
preparers and auditors specific qualitative questions that would support this study’s research 
objectives. 
Both the survey and the quantitative research design enabled the study to obtain a detailed 
explanation of the associations and mediating effects of the variables rather than focusing on 
narrow explanations. The use of surveys also enabled the study to explain new factors that were 
not considered by previous researchers. Nevertheless, the survey methodology despite addressing 
part of the study’s objective, suffers from some limitations; it measures beliefs which may not 
coincide with the respondents’ action or respondents may give information that they think the 
researcher wants to hear (Graham et al., 2005). To address this possibility where for example the 
respondent gives feedback on what they learned in school rather than what is actually done on the 
ground, the study used different approaches when choosing the respondents and when analysing 
the data. 
3.3 Population and sampling 
The Population is a complete set of elements (persons, events or objects) that pose some common 
characteristics defined by the sampling criteria established by the researcher (Creswell, 2013). 
Most researchers tended to agree that population study is more representative. They base their 
argument on the assumption that every element had an equal chance to be included in the drawn 
sample. One of the fallacies encountered when using a population study was that it assumed 
homogeneity in research, while in fact, this statement does not hold water for all studies and 
therefore the reason why sampling and the use of the case studies are more preferred in other 
studies (Che-Ahmad & Abidin, 2008; Malsch & Salterio, 2016).  
3.3.1 Sampling Frame 
 The population of the study was well defined. The targeted population was listed companies in 
the NSE. To eliminate a potential bias, the sampling technique used in the study was purposeful 
considering the following criteria: First, the companies should have been registered and were in 
operation for the period starting 1st January 2007 – to the period ending 30th December 2016. This 
was to ensure that all companies included have the appropriate number of years of operation. These 
years were also considered to be the most recent yearly reports available as at the time of the study. 
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Secondly, companies offering financial services which include companies in the banking, 
insurance, and investment industries were also eliminated from the sample. These industries are 
under some regulations which give the minimum required audit report period. Given that audit 
report lag is our main variable in questions, it was inevitable to exclude these companies because 
their audit report period seemed to be consistent. Table 3.1 Presents the sectoral distribution of the 
population and sampled companies in the NSE. 
Table 3.1: Sectoral Distribution of the population and Sampled Companies 
Industry sector Number of listed firms Number of sampled firms 
Agriculture  7 5 
Automobile  3 2 
Construction and allied  5 5 
Banking  11 0 
Energy and petroleum  5 4 
Commercial and services  11 6 
Manufacturing  9 5 
Telecommunication  1 1 
Real estate Investment  1 0 
Insurance  6 0 
Investment services  1 0 
Investment  5 0 
Total 65 28 
Source NSE 2017 
3.4 Data Collection Instrument 
This study relied on both the primary and secondary data. The secondary data used in addressing 
the first and second objectives were sourced from the annual reports (which could be obtained 
from the company website or the NSE database). The primary data were collected using the 
questionnaire in appendix II. This helped in addressing the third research question. Other than the 
annual reports, this study obtained more secondary data from other sources like the CMA’s website 
and any other sources that were deemed relevant. 
3.5 Data Processing and Analysis 
To achieve the study objectives, a seven-stage approach was followed when processing and 
analyzing the data. In the first stage, audit report lag period was determined from the annual 
financial statements using the data collection tool in (appendix v). In the second stage, both the 
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primary and secondary data collected was cleaned, coded and classified in preparation for analysis 
at the next five stages. 
The third stage entailed the first analysis stage. In this stage, a regression of the determinant of 
audit report lag (equation i) was performed to determine the estimated audit report lag that was 
later used in the association test between audit report lag and earnings quality. In the fourth stage, 
a regression of the discretionary accruals variable using Deschow model see (equation ii) was 
carried out to determine the residuals of the model which is assumed to be the measure of earnings 
quality in this study, followed by an association test between the estimated audit report lag and the 
residuals from the discretionary accruals model to measure earnings quality in the fifth stage, see 
(equation iii). In the sixth stage, a mediation test of corporate governance quality characteristics 
was done to test the mediating effect of corporate governance on the association between earnings 
quality and audit report lag  see (equation iv). Finally, in the last stage, the data from the primary 
data was analyzed and compared to the findings of the secondary data. 
The equations below provide detailed explanation of the variables used in the study.  
The following model was used to calculate the unexplained audit report lag. The unexplained audit 
report lag was the error term from the regression of ARL and its determinants. This error term was 
then used to test whether it has an association with earnings quality.   





t+YEARSi, t + INDi, t +ƹi, t                                                                                                     (equation i) 
Where: 
ARLi, t= Audit report lag of company i at time t  
AUDFACTORSi, t= Audit related factors (auditor type, audit fee and audit risk) of firm i time t 
COMPANYCHARi, t= Company related factors (complexity, foreign ownership, leverage, industry 
sector, firm size, ownership concentration profit warning) of firm i time t 
CORPORATEGOVi, t= Corporate governance quality score and audit committee quality score of 
firm i at time t 
32 
 
YEARSi, t=Firm year control  
INDi, t = Industry control  
Ƹi, t= error term (Which the study uses as an estimated audit report lag)  
3.5.2  Equation to determine the discretionary accruals residuals 
The following equation is a regression of the total accruals.  In this model the estimate of accruals 
quality are based on the statistical properties of the discretionary accruals. High accrual quality 
will be used as a proxy for high earnings quality. Therefore this equation provides an inverse 
measure of earnings quality. The absolute values of the residuals measure the earnings quality.  
TAi, t = β0+β1 (1/Ai, t-1) + β2 (∆REVi, t- ∆RECi, t) + β3PPEi, t+ƹi, t    (Equation ii) 
Where: 
TAi, t = Total accruals in year t for firm i Calculated as (∆ Current assets-∆ Current liabilities-
Cash+Short Term Debt-Depreciation and amortization Expenses)/ Ai, t-1 
Ai, t-1 =Total assets in the year t-1 for firm i 
∆REVi, t= Revenue in year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm i scaled by Ai, t-1 
∆RECi, t= Receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i scaled by Ai, t-1 
PPEi, t=Gross property plant and equipment in the year t for firm i scaled by Ai, t-1 
Ƹi, t=error term in the year t for firm i 
This formula gives the non-discretionary accruals. Therefore the residuals of the regression model 
will represent discretionary accruals (DACC). 
3.5.3  Equation to determine the association between ARL and DACC 
In the fifth stage the association test between audit report lag and earnings quality to test the first 
hypotheses: 
H1: Earnings quality is negatively associated with audit report lag. 
ARL=β0+ β1DACC + β2∑i




ARL = the audit report lag from equation- the unexplained audit report lag (i) 
DACC= the residuals from equation (ii) 
CONTROLVARit= Where the auditor type, the log of total assets, foreign ownership  
YEARSi, t = Firm year control   
INDi, t = Industry control  
ƹi, t= error term 
3.5.4  Determining the mediating effect of CGQS on the association between ARL and DACC 
A mediating variable explains why such an association occurs. Therefore, the mediation test 
discussed in chapter two was applied by first developing a mediating variable. 
After defining the mediating variable the following mediation test was carried out  
ARL = β0 + β1 DACC + β2 CGQS + β3 ∑i
nCONTROLVARi, t+YEARSi, t + INDi, t +ƹi(equation iv) 
Where 
ARL = the audit report lag from equation (i) 
CGQS = Mediating variable  
DACC= the residuals from equation ii 
CONTROLVARit= Where the auditor type, the log of total assets, foreign ownership  
YEARSi, t= Firm year control   
INDi, t= Industry control  
Ƹi, t= error term 
During analysis, if the model is degraded and the parameters remained unaffected, then the study 
can conclude that the influence of the earnings quality on audit report lag become relatively 
insignificant. Otherwise, in the presence of a corporate governance quality; this means that the 
effects of the earnings quality are “completely” mediated by corporate governance quality. It is 
also important to note that when the influence of the earnings quality remains insignificant in the 
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presence of corporate governance quality, then the effect of the independent variable (EQ) is 
partially “mediated”. Finally there would be no mediating effect if any of the above conditions 
were not satisfied. 
3.6 Research Quality 
To ensure validity, the researcher conducted a pilot study which enabled the researcher to align 
the data collection instruments to the research objectives. The questionnaires were administered to 
the first five respondents and thereafter repetitive or meaningless questions were excluded from 
the data collection instrument. This process enabled the study to achieve internal validity through 
justifying the extent to which the variation would be considered a causal relationship (Internal 
validity) and whether the causal relationship could be generalized (External validity). 
3.7 Ethical Issues in Research 
The researcher did not use the names of the respondents or the names of the companies in the 
study. Each participant and company was coded with a unique number known only to the 
researcher. By using generic names and codes in the study, for example, referring to respondents 
as accountants or auditors, this helped the study avoid ethical issues related to privacy.  
During the administering of the questionnaires, the researcher sought to obtain informed consent 
from the participants. After explaining a brief background of the study, the researcher informed 





PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
The findings of the primary and secondary data collected during the study are enumerated in this 
chapter in four separated sections; the first one being an introduction. The second section presents 
results from the diagnostic tests; the study conducted an autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity test. Consequently, secondary data results were analyzed where the association 
and mediation tests results are diagrammatically presented. Subsequently, a succinct depiction of 
the results from the primary data analysis is made. The presentation of the primary data 
encompassed the demographic data and stakeholders’ perspectives on the influence of corporate 
governance qualities on the audit report lag and earnings quality. In closing, the primary results 
were corroborated with the secondary results. 
4.2  Sample representation 
Table 4.1 presents the sample breakdown for the 66 targeted companies on the NSE as of 31 
December 2017. 






Total companies listed as of 31 December 2017 66 594 
Listed companies since 1st January 2016 to 2017 (1) 9 
Number of delisted companies (1) 9 
Number of companies listed during the study period (16) 144 
Unavailable annual reports  0 
Banking Insurance and investment companies  (16) 144 
Companies in the sampled industries that were 
deregistered from trading during the sampled period  (4) 36 
Total number of companies sampled  28 252 
Number of missing observations  39 
Number of observations in the final sample  213 
 
According to Table 4.1, the final sample consist of twenty-eight companies with two hundred fifty-
two expected observations. The total number of listed companies as at December 2017 were sixty-
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six. Sixteen companies that were listed during the study period were not included in the sample 
because the data to be obtained from them would have been incomplete. The other sixteen listed 
companies from banking, insurance, and investments sections were also not included in the 
sampled data. Companies from the financial sector were excluded from the sample to enhance the 
generalizability of the study findings. The Deschow (1994) model has been cited to be one of the 
best models for measuring earnings quality for non-financial companies (Deshow 1994, DeFond 
(1994) Kanagaretnam (2015). Therefore, either using the same method to measure earnings quality 
of the financial firms or using a different method to measure the earnings quality would lead to 
possible biases in the study. The sample size also excludes two companies one which was listed 
and the other was delisted during the sample period. Four companies from the sampled industries 
that were deregistered from trading were also excluded from the sample.   
4.3 Diagnostic tests 
This section explains the diagnostic tests carried on the data prior to further analysis in the study. 
The diagnostic tests performed included: the normality tests, test for autocorrelation, test for multi-
collinearity and reliability test. 
4.3.1 Normality tests 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the Q-Q plots for ARL and DACC respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1: Q-Q plot for ARL 
 
Figure 4.2: Q-Q plot for DACC  
According to the figures above, the ARL seems to follow a near-normal distribution while the 











































































































































4.482 while that of DACC was 1.708 and 45.593. Implying that for the skewness, the data was 
evenly skewed with a value less than two (>2). For the Kurtosis, which explains the peakedness 
of the data with values greater than <3 showing that there are many outliers. Presence of outliers 
means that the tail in the DACC data is heavier than the normal distribution. Since the main 
variable of interest, ARL was near normally distributed, a Panel Two-Stage Least Squares 
regression approach was utilized. A Panel least regression is the extension of the ordinary least 
square method. It is mostly used to analyze structural questions especially when the dependent 
variable (audit report lag) is correlated with the independent variable (earnings quality).  
4.3.2  Test for Autocorrelation 
Table 4.4 shows the Durbin-Watson test on the regressions carried out  
Table 4.2: Durbin-Watson statistics 
Regression  Durbin-Watson 
statistics  
Regression – The association between ARL and CGQS 1.328 
Regression influence of earnings quality on the audit report lag  1.373 
Regression,ARL, CGQ and DACC 1.331 
Regression–The mediating effect of corporate governance on the 
association between  ARL and DACC 
1.352 
 
Autocorrelation or serial correlation characteristic appears in data when the correlation between 
the values of the same variable is either based on related objects or violates the assumption of 
independence in the model. It mostly appears in data selected from the same source and could lead 
to incorrect standard errors. In this study, the serial correlation was checked using the Durbin-
Watson statistic consistent with (Mathuva, 2016; Owino, 2017). According to (Gujarati, 2004) the 
null hypotheses of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected if the Durbin- Watson statistic was equal 
or close to 2. From this study findings, Table 4.2 shows the Durbin-Watson statistic figures were 
close to two, therefore, the autocorrelation did not pose a problem.  
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4.3.3  Test for multi-collinearity 
Multi-collinearity is a type of disturbance in the data. It arises when there are very high 
intercorrelations or inter-associations among the independent variables. When this occurs, the 
statistical inference made on the data may not be reliable. Previous studies on ARL used the 
Spearman’s correlation matrix to test for multi-collinearity (Owino, 2016; Sultana et al., 2015). 
However, the fact that this study tests the mediating effect of an independent variable, a mediating 
variable, unlike a moderating effect, influences both the independent and the dependent variable. 
Therefore, this study found it relevant to use both the correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) to test for the multi-collinearity. Prior studies state that when the VIF is less than ten 
(10) then this implies no multicollinearity exists. From the correlation matrix in table 4.5 and the 
VIF on the database, the study shows that no multi-collinearity existed. 
4.3.4  Test for Fixed or Random Effects 
A Hausmann test was performed to determine whether fixed effects of random effects model is to 
be used. The test summary showed a Chi-square statistic of 48.889 (7 chi-square degrees of 
freedom) with a significance of p < 0.01. Since the test statistic was large and significant, the null 
hypothesis was rejected and fixed effects regression model was used. 
4.3.5  Reliability test for questionnaire data 
Table 4.3 shows the chronbach’s reliability test on the primary data 
Table 4.3: Cronbach’s alpha 
  Reliability Statistics 
 Section of the questionnaire Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
Effects on audit report lag  0.877 28 
Effect on earnings quality 0.844 21 
Mediating effect of corporate governance  0.768 7 
 
Table 4.3 shows the Chronbac’s reliability test on the primary data. Chronbach’s alpha as 
discussed by (Field, 2013) was used to measure the internal consistency of the primary data using 
SPSS. Model questions were found to be closely related as a group with a value which surpasses 
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the recommended value of a range between 0.7 and 0.8. Therefore there was no need for 
conducting total statistical tests. 
4.4  Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 213 observations 
over the period 2006 to 2016 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for the full sample 
 Variable   N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum Skewness  Kurtosis 
ARL 213 91.041 88.572 13.177 65.722 142.237 1.062 4.482 
DACC 213 -0.125 -0.164 1.037 -6.807 8.517 1.708 45.593 
CGQS 213 0.640 0.667 0.168 0.000 0.917 -1.178 6.074 
AUDITOR_TYPE 213 0.845 1.000 0.363 0.000 1.000 -1.907 4.638 
LN_TA (SIZE) 213 16.114 16.026 1.619 10.964 19.652 -0.214 3.073 
FOREIGN SHARES 213 0.236 0.076 0.280 0.000 0.977 0.982 2.989 
LEVERAGE 213 0.506 0.484 0.237 0.000 1.611 1.195 6.247 
ACQS 213 0.881 1.000 0.222 0.167 1.000 -2.122 6.852 
 
According to results in Table 4.4 which represents the descriptive statistics of the data. The audit 
report lag has a mean of 91.041 days with a standard deviation from the mean of 13.177. This 
means that an audit of non-financial firm listed in the NSE will take on average 77 days to 104 
Days. These findings on audit report lag are similar to Owino (2017) findings of the audit report 
lag in the NSE. However, Blankey (2015) found out that the audit report lag in the American firms 
was between 50.8 to 79.9 days. Audit report lag was found to be higher in developing countries 
than in the developed countries Blankey (2015) cite more. In Indonesia, the finding on audit report 
lag for listed companies was an average of 76.54 days, the one for manufacturing firms was 
between 30 to 141 days. It seems that on average these are the audit report lag.   
The DACC which is a measure of Earnings quality has a mean of -0.125 and a standard deviation 
of 1.037. This means that the range of the quality of earnings varies between -1.162 to 0.912. This 
implies that there exists a possibility of poor earnings quality in the NSE listed non-financial firms. 
The corporate governance qualities have a mean of 0.64 and standard deviation of 0.16. According 
to the corporate governance quality index in appendix IV. On average listed non-financial firms 
are keen on implementing corporate governance. Studies attempted to link this to the strong 
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regulatory environment for the listed companies. The size of the company was calculated using 
the natural log of the total assets. 
4.5  Correlation analysis 
Table 4.5 Presents the Spearman’s correlations for the variables in the study. 
Table 4.5 Correlation matrix 
Variable ARL  DACC CGQS  
AUDITOR_T
YPE  LN_TA  
FOREIGN 
SHARES LEVERAGE  
DACC - coefficient 0.022       
p-value 0.746       
CGQS - coefficient 0.076 -0.282***      
p-value 0.272 0.000      
AUDITOR_TYPE - 
coefficient -0.538*** -0.028 -0.183***     
p-value 0.000 0.686 0.008     
LN_TA - coefficient -0.182*** -0.251*** 0.564*** -0.002    
p-value 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.978    
FOREIGN SHARES- 
coefficient -0.444*** -0.067 0.074 0.138** 0.119*   
p-value 0.000 0.332 0.280 0.045 0.082   
LEVERAGE - coefficient 0.448*** 0.307*** 0.002 -0.227*** 0.128* -0.058  
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.972 0.001 0.063 0.397  
ACQS - coefficient -0.177*** -0.080 0.506*** -0.199*** 0.417*** 0.234*** 0.138*** 
p-value 0.010 0.242 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.044 
*** - significant at the 1%, ** - significant at the 5%, * - significant at the 10% levels. 
According to the Spearman’s correlation matrix results in Table 4.5, the strength of the association 
between variables in the study has been measured. Spearman’s’ correlation coefficient is a 
nonparametric rank statistics that measure the strength of the relationship between two variables 
and unlike other measures like the Pearson’s’ correlation, Spearman’s correlation matrix does not 
need the data to be linear (Gujarati, 2004). The correlation matrix also presents the findings of the 
association test. 
The findings of the correlation of the variables were as follows: the correlation coefficient between 
DACC and CGQs was 0.282 with a p-value of 0.000, therefore, there is a positive and significant 
association between the earnings quality and the corporate governance quality in the study. The 
study also finds that Auditor type, total assets, foreign shareholding, Leverage and audit committee 
characteristics were all significant to the ARL. The negative coefficients mean that there is a 
negative relationship between audit report lag and auditor type. This could imply that companies 
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with small auditors tend to have longer audit report lag. The correlation coefficient of the total 
assets to the audit report lag was negative with a significant P-Value. This could mean that 
companies with large assets could have shorter audit report lag. Foreign shareholding and audit 
committee quality characteristics had been being both significant with a negative coefficient which 
could be interpreted as the higher the quality of audit committee and the shorter the audit report 
lag and the more the foreign ownership the shorter the audit report lag. 
While there is a positive relationship between the audit report lag and corporate governance 
qualities. The variable DACC which is a measure of earnings quality had a positive relationship 
with the Audit report lag, however, with a P-Value of 0.746, it was not significant implying that 
the earnings quality may not be related to the audit report lag. The same applies to audit report lag 
and corporate governance qualities, though there is a positive association between this variable the 
association has a P-Value of 0.272 therefore not significant.  
The correlation matrix apart from indicating the association between the variable, it was also used 
in this study to determine which panel models individual effect term could be used. The random 
effect is only sufficient for use in cases where there are no correlation between the variables in the 
regression. However the fixed effect model is efficient in both situation where there is correlation 
with the model and where there is no correlation. For this reason the study used a fixed effect. 
According to Hausmans’ test we reject the null hypothesis and use the fixed effect.   
4.6  Regression results 
4.6.1 Establishing the discretionary accruals 
Regression analyses were performed to first establish the discretionary accruals (DACC) to be 








Table 4.6: Results of discretionary accruals estimation 
Dependent Variable: Total accruals         
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
1/At-1 2011.556 34617.090 0.058 0.954 
PPE/ At-1 -0.152 0.158 -0.963 0.337 
(∆REVi,t- ∆RECi,t) 0.036 0.092 0.393 0.695 
Intercept 0.121 0.144 0.843 0.400 
          
R-squared 0.005    
S.E. of regression 1.030    
Sum squared resid 221.806    
Log likelihood -306.548    
F-statistic 0.384         
Prob(F-statistic) 0.765       
Durbin-Watson stat 3.819    
Observations 213       
Critical value at 99%>2.33, critical value at 95%>1.96, critical value at 90%>1.645  
The initial model to establish the discretionary accruals using Dechow, 1994; M. F. McNichols, 
2000; Table 4.6 shows summary statistics of the regression. Though the results of the t- statistics 
and the R-Squared is insignificant, this means that the omitted variables explain the discretionary 
accruals. From the table, this shows that the DACC is explained by the residuals which shall be 
used in the regression to test the association between audit report lag and earnings quality.  
4.6.2 Influence of earnings quality (DACC) on ARL 
Regression analysis was performed to establish the influence of earnings quality on ARL. The 









Table 4.7: Influence of earnings quality (DACC) on ARL 
Dependent Variable: ARL     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
DACC -0.503 0.517 -0.972 0.332 
AUDITOR_TYPE -21.080*** 1.651 -12.768 0.000 
LN_TA -1.656*** 0.483 -3.426 0.001 
FOREIGNSHAREHOLDERCOMPANY -13.700*** 2.142 -6.396 0.000 
LEVERAGE 20.084*** 2.446 8.210 0.000 
ACQS -8.173*** 3.244 -2.520 0.013 
IS_AGRIC 2.345 2.756 0.851 0.396 
IS_AUTO___ACCESSO -6.264** 2.795 -2.241 0.026 
IS_COMM_SERV 3.444* 1.783 1.931 0.055 
IS_MAN -2.478 1.872 -1.324 0.187 
IS_TELECOM 3.855 3.333 1.157 0.249 
YEAR 0.462* 0.240 1.927 0.055 
INDUSTRY_INDEX 0.011 0.077 0.141 0.888 
Intercept  -805.747 488.116 -1.651 0.100 
          
R-squared 0.678    
Adjusted R-squared 0.656    
S.E. of regression 7.723    
F-statistic 32.165    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
Instrument rank 18.000     
Durbin-Watson stat 1.373    
Hausmann Chi-square stat 48.889    
Significance of Hausmann Chi-square 0.000    
Observations 213    
*** - significant at the 1%, ** - significant at the 5%, * - significant at the 10% levels. 
Critical value at 99%>2.33, critical value at 95%>1.96, critical value at 90%>1.645  
According to the results in Table 4.7, the model is significant with an F statistic of 0.000 which 
means that at least one of the variables is significant. The R-squared is 0.678 which also means 
that the variables explain 67.8% of the model. Earnings quality has a negative effect on the audit 
report lag though the effect is not significant with a t>1.645. Therefore, even though discretionary 
accruals has a negative coefficient it is not statistically significant. From the industry perspective, 
the automobile and accessories and the commercial services are significant with a negative 
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coefficient meaning that companies in the manufacturing industries have a shorter audit report lag 
than companies in the other industries while with a positive significant coefficient of 3.444 could 
imply that companies in the commercial services would have a longer audit report lag than 
companies in agriculture and manufacturing industry. Though the telecom industry has also a 
coefficient of 3.855 these findings are not statistically significant with a statistic of 1.157. 
4.6.3  Influence of CGQs on ARL 
Regression analysis was performed to establish the influence of corporate governance qualities on 
ARL. The results are presented in Table 4.8 
Table 4.8: Influence of CGQs on ARL 
Dependent Variable: ARL         
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.   
     
CGQS  31.321***          5.380          5.822  0.000 
AUDITOR_TYPE -17.747***         1.636     (10.849) 0.000 
LN_TA -3.585***         0.559       (6.410) 0.000 
FOREIGNSHAREHOLDERCOMPANY -13.63***         1.985       (6.869) 0.000 
LEVERAGE 21.019***         2.270          9.261  0.000 
ACQS -16.377***         3.315       (4.940) 0.000 
IS_AGRIC   2.150          2.552          0.842          0.401  
IS_AUTO___ACCESSO  -9.119**          2.636       (3.460)         0.001  
IS_COMM_SERV   0.988          1.707          0.579          0.563  
IS_MAN -3.629**         1.745       (2.080)         0.039  
IS_TELECOM   2.985          3.089          0.966          0.335  
YEAR  0.479*          0.222          2.154          0.032  
INDUSTRY_INDEX   0.054          0.072          0.755          0.451  
Intercept -866.846*    451.922       (1.918)         0.057  
          
R-squared 0.723       
Adjusted R-squared 0.705       
S.E. of regression 7.156       
F-statistic 39.989       
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000       
Instrument rank 18.000       
Durbin-Watson stat 1.328       
Observations  213       
*** - significant at the 1%, ** - significant at the 5%, * - significant at the 10% levels. 
Critical value at 99%>2.33, critical value at 95%>1.96, critical value at 90%>1.645  
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According to the results in Table 4.8, the model is significant with an F statistic of 0.000 which 
means that at least one of the variables is significant. The R-squared is 0.723 which also means 
that the variables explain 72.3% of the model. Corporate governance quality has a positive effect 
on the audit report lag. The effect is significant with a probability of 0.000. Therefore, corporate 
governance quality has a positive coefficient to ARL and is statistically significant. From the 
industry perspective, the automobile and manufacturing are significant with a positive coefficient, 
meaning that corporate governance in the automobile and manufacturing industries is key in 
reducing audit report lag than companies in the other industries.  
4.6.4  Mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the association between earnings 
quality and ARL 
Table 4.9 reports the results of the mediation effect of corporate governance quality on the 

















Table 4.9: Mediating effect of CGQ on DACC and ARL 
Dependent Variable: ARL     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
DACC 4.782* 2.444 1.956 0.052 
CGQS 26.775*** 5.723 4.679 0.000 
AUDITOR_TYPE -17.682*** 1.624 -10.887 0.000 
LN_TA -3.645*** 0.556 -6.557 0.000 
FOREIGNSHAREHOLDERCOMPANY -13.480*** 1.971 -6.839 0.000 
LEVERAGE 22.213*** 2.316 9.591 0.000 
ACQS -14.718*** 3.375 -4.361 0.000 
IS_AGRIC 1.848 2.537 0.728 0.467 
IS_AUTO___ACCESSO -8.331*** 2.641 -3.154 0.002 
IS_COMM_SERV 0.383 1.716 0.223 0.824 
IS_MAN -3.976*** 1.740 -2.285 0.023 
IS_TELECOM 1.673 3.123 0.536 0.593 
YEAR 0.422* 0.222 1.904 0.058 
INDUSTRY_INDEX 0.064 0.072 0.896 0.371 
Intercept  -762.962* 451.039 -1.692 0.092 
     
R-squared 0.730    
Adjusted R-squared 0.709    
S.E. of regression 7.103    
F-statistic 35.505    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
Instrument rank 18.000    
Durbin-Watson stat 1.352    
Observations 213    
*** - significant at the 1%, ** - significant at the 5%, * - significant at the 10% levels. 
Critical value at 99%>2.33, critical value at 95%>1.96, critical value at 90%>1.645  
According to the results in Table 4.8, the regression model is significant with an F-statistic of 0.000 
and R-squared of 73%. This means that the model is significant, the variables explain our 
dependents variable. Introduction of a mediating effect CGQS has strengthened the model. This 
means that companies that practice quality corporate governance are likely to have a shorter audit 
report lag. It is also interesting to note that the introduction of a mediating effect into the model 
make the DACC significant at 10% level.  This means that corporate governance quality mediates 
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the association between audit report lag and earnings quality. This confirms our hypothesis to be 
true. 
From the industry perspective, the manufacturing and the automobile and accessories were 
significant. This implies that the mediating effect of corporate governance on the association 
between audit report lag and earnings quality is higher in automobile and accessories industry and 
manufacturing industry. These two industries have a negative coefficient meaning that companies 
in these industries have a shorter audit report lag. It interesting to also note that though companies 
in the commercial services were significant in the previous model in table 4.7 to test the association 
between audit report lag and earnings quality. They are not significant when the moderating effect 
is introduced. This could be interpreted that the quality of corporate governance in the commercial 
services may not have an impact on the association between audit report lag and earnings quality. 
4.7  Questionnaire results on the preparer and auditor views on influence of earnings quality 
on CGQ and ARL 
4.7.1 Demographic data 
Table 4.9 reports the demographic results of the participants who filled in the research 













Table 4.9: Questionnaires Demographic Data 
    Frequency  Valid Percentage 
Gender     
1 Male 10 52.6 
2 Female 9 47.4 
Occupation     
1 Finance manager 2 10.5 
2 Accountant 7 36.8 
3 External auditor 2 10.5 
4 Others 8 42.1 
Years of experience     
1 Between 1- less than 5 years 9 47.4 
2 between 5 years to less than 10 years 9 47.4 
3 Over 15 years 1 5.3 
Professional Accounting qualification     
1 ACCA 4 22.2 
2 CPA 12 66.7 
3 CFA 1 5.6 
4 Others 1 5.6 
Total 19   
 
According to table 4.10 derived from the primary data questionnaires, the demographic results 
show that among the Thirty-eight (N= 38) respondents to the questionnaire, twenty were male 
(52.6%) while eighteen were female (47.4%). In addition to this, the findings in table 4.9 could be 
interpreted to explain that the number of women in the accounting and auditing profession is 
slowly increasing the number of women still lag behind. The findings were therefore similar to 
(Iraya et al., 2015; Owino, 2016) who also found that the number of women in the auditing and 
accounting profession was steadily increasing in the listed companies. Mohamed, (2013) in his 
study on fraud found out that, accounting and auditing firms had put in processes that would 
enhance gender inclusiveness. These could be one of the reasons for supporting these findings. 
The question on respondents’ main profession had 57.9% in the accounting profession while 
42.1% indicated other professions. These were mainly management accountants, forensic auditors, 
and consultants who 88.9% have professional accounting qualification. For this reason, the other 
indicated profession was still in the accounting field and therefore their feedback informed the 
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study. On average, half of the respondents had at least more than five years’ experience while the 
rest had worked for at least one year but not more than five years, with this fact of the duration 
they had worked, helped in validating the questionnaires because they had the required experience. 
Most of the respondents agreed on the fact that auditors should take less than one year to complete 
the audit. In conclusion, based on the demographic data of the study the respondents had the right 
qualifications to be able to give valid informative data for the study. 
4.7.2  Preparer and auditor views on the influence of earnings quality on CGQ and ARL 
From the analysis of the feedback from the table the questionnaire most respondents strongly 
agreed to the questions on whether corporate governance qualities enhanced ARL. Some of the 
strongly agreed to points on corporate governance were; trained board members and the presence 
of an audit committee reduces the audit report lag. However, they were neutral and even some 
disagreed on either presence of gender diversity in the audit committee, or having more than ten 
board members or holding more than ten committee meetings in a year would reduce the audit 
report lag.  
Feedback on the association between audit report lag and earnings quality was strongly agreed to 
by the respondents. The respondent felt that auditors took longer to audit where there were 
disagreements with the management or when they suspect fraud. The question on whether when a 
company reports profiting the audit take long was neither strongly agreed to nor disagreed to. This 
may mean that the audit process is more dependent on the other factors than whether a profit or a 
loss is made. 
The feedback on the mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the association between 
audit report lag and earnings quality was well responded to. One of the key questions on whether 
auditors take long to audit when they have earnings management challenges was strongly agreed 
to, however, it was surprising that most respondents also believed that gender diversity increases 
audit report lag and if board elections are held annually then this would reduce the earnings quality.  
4.8 Triangulation of results of secondary and primary data 
 
This chapter began by presenting the sampling process followed by the diagnostic tests for both 
the primary and the secondary data. Generally, the findings from the secondary data show that 
there is no significant association between the audit report lag and the earnings quality. From the 
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primary data questionnaires, the respondent was almost indifferent with their opinion with some 
agreeing to the fact that issues like management disagreement with the auditor on financial 
reporting and when accounts need further adjustments, then the audit report will be longer. 
However, they were indifferent on whether when a company reports a loss or when a company 
reports a profit with a negative cash position would lead to a longer audit report lag.  
Nevertheless, the results on the mediating effect of corporate governance on the association 
between audit report lag and earnings quality from the secondary data were significant. This fact 
reflected clearly on the questionnaires feedback with most respondents strongly agreeing to the 
questions on whether the identified corporate governance qualities would influence either the audit 
report lag or the earnings quality. Based on both the primary and the secondary data it is evident 






DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter five draws a conclusion and gives recommendations on the basis of the literature review 
and research findings. A critical discussion of the research findings on each research objective is 
undertaken. On the first research objective of the association between audit report lag and earnings 
quality, the discussion revolves around the research finding that there is no association. The second 
research objective on the mediating effect of corporate governance on the association between 
audit report lag and earnings quality; the mediating effect that exists in analyzed. On the third 
research objective, the views of stakeholders on the influence of corporate governance quality on 
audit report lag and earnings quality are illuminated. This is followed up with concluding insights 
on the research findings. The chapter wraps up with giving recommendations and a caveat on the 
limitations of the study with possible areas for further research and review. 
5.2  Discussion of findings 
5.2.1 The association between audit report lag and earnings quality 
The study sought to establish the association between audit report lag and earnings quality of listed 
non-financial firm in the NSE. Hence, the regression results in Table 4.7 with an R-squared of 
67.8% and a Prob (F-Statistic) of 0.000 showed that the earnings quality had a beta of -0.503. This 
implied that a change in the quality of earnings (that is when earnings quality improve) causes a 
change in the audit report days by 0.503 days. Though findings indicate a slight change in the 
number of audit days the model was not statistically significant even though the other variables in 
the model were significant. 
One of the recent studies by (Asthana, 2014) found that there is an association between audit report 
lag and earnings quality. Therefore, the result reported in this study are contradicting a few past 
studies with finding proving that audit report lag influence audit quality. The researcher relates 
these findings to the difference in the measure of earnings quality. While this study measured 
earnings quality simply as discretionary accruals, some previous studies disagree with this measure 
claiming that discretionary accruals is only a part of the earnings quality and therefore they 
introduce other proxies to measure earnings quality such as earnings timeliness, volatility, 
predictability, persistence, transitory and the possibility that the earnings per share missed the 
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analyst forecast made during the thirty calendar days preceding the fiscal year-end. This could the 
key reason for the difference in the findings. 
Regardless of the findings that no association exists between audit report lag and earnings quality, 
the model used was significant. Indicating that the auditor type, company leverage, and foreign 
ownership were key variables that influence audit report lag. Even though this Variable were not 
our key focus these findings were consistent with previous studies by (Afify, 2009b; Apadore & 
Mohd Noor, 2013; Dao & Pham, 2014; Owino, 2016). To back up this findings majority of the 
responses from the preparers were indifferent on whether earnings quality was associated to audit 
report lag. This could be interpreted to mean that the accounting practitioners had no clear idea of 
whether there is an association between the audit report lag and the earnings quality.  
5.2.2  The mediating effect of corporate governance quality on the association between audit 
report lag and earnings quality. 
The results from secondary data analysis showed that there is a mediating effect of corporate 
governance on the association between earning quality and audit report lag. When the findings 
were corroborated by the results from the primary data the preparers of accounts seemed to agree 
that corporate governance quality affects earnings quality. These findings were similar to previous 
findings by (Halim, Mustika, Sari, Anugerah, &Mohd-Sanusi, 2017; Sáenz González &García-
Meca, 2014). In addition to this local studies by Iraya (2015) and Waweru (2013) both found out 
that for companies listed in the NSE board size and board independence which are some of the key 
attributes of corporate governance affect earnings management. In addition to this, from the 
questionnaire, the question on whether board size influence had on earnings quality had an average 
of 4.42 with a standard deviation of 0.82. This meant that the preparers of the accounts strongly 
agreed while others agreed to the question on whether the board size affects earnings management. 
Although the findings prove that corporate governance index had an influence on the earnings 
quality, it is important to note that while presence of non-executive directors has been widely 
discussed in the literature as an indicator of quality corporate governance (Halim et al., 2017; 
Waweru, 2014), in this study, the preparers of the accounts were mostly neutral as to whether the 
presence of non-executive directors influences audit report lag or earnings quality. 
On whether corporate governance quality affects audit report lag, the respondents agreed to most 
of the questions asked. As such, these findings were consistent with the previous findings by 
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(Afify, 2009b; NaimiMohamad-Nor, Shafie, & Wan-Hussin, 2010) who found that presence of 
poor corporate governance could lead to audit delay. Earnings quality and audit report lag were 
combined to get the mediating effect.  
The mediating effect was presented in 4.8 with an R-squared of 73.0% which means that the 
variables used explained 73.0% of the audit report lag thus, the model was significant. This means 
that corporate governance quality mediates the association between audit report lag and earnings 
quality. In addition to these findings, the preparers tended to have agreed that: when there is a need 
for many adjustments in the financial statements when board elections are held annually or the 
more the board members are in an audit committee, these will influence the quality of earnings 
and audit report lag. These findings also showed that the presence of gender diversity in the board 
would improve earnings quality and reduce audit report lag. 
5.3  Conclusions 
This study addressed the following research questions: how does earnings quality influence audit 
report lag of non-financial companies listed on the NSE? What mediating role does corporate 
governance quality play on the association between earnings quality and audit report lag in non-
financial companies listed on the NSE? Whether annual report preparers and auditors perceive an 
association between earnings quality, corporate governance quality and audit report lag? To the 
extent that ARL has a relationship with earnings quality, in that audit report lag could be caused 
by serious differences between the clients reported figures in the financial statement and the 
auditors advised figures to be reported in the financial statement. It was key to note the fact that 
audit delay is more observable than earnings quality, investors may, therefore, use audit report lag 
to form an opinion on the quality of earnings. 
In the second objective, the role of corporate governance quality in mediating the relationship 
between earnings quality and ARL was found to be significant with an R squared of 72%. 
However, this may not always be the case unless corporate governance quality is maintained. In 
light of these facts, companies should come up with measures for overcoming corporate 
governance challenges in a way that they ensure corporate governance quality is practiced so as to 
maintain the mediating effect corporate governance on the association. These findings are hence 
important in understanding the mechanism of the audit process to the extent that earnings quality 
and corporate governance qualities mediate the association. The fact that detecting earnings quality 
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is not as direct as observing audit report lag, policymakers such as the CMA and investors may 
use Audit report lag and CGQ variables as indicators of the presence or lack of earnings quality. 
5.4  Recommendations 
5.4.1  To Researchers 
A researcher could use this study as a key contribution to knowledge on the determinants of audit 
report lag. This study investigates the relationship between earnings quality, audit report lag and 
corporate governance quality in a developing economy. Therefore, these findings also contribute 
to the literature on both corporate governance and earnings quality. 
5.4.2  To company managers and auditors  
The fact that poor earnings quality is not easily detected from a company makes this study relevant 
to auditors and shareholders, as it provides an additional material of which managers, shareholders' 
and auditors can use as a red flag on the quality of earnings. 
5.4.3  To Regulators and policymakers   
Regulators play an important role in formulating policies and ensuring the regulated companies 
adhere to the formulated codes. Considering this function of regulators, knowledge on the 
moderating effect of corporate governance may inform policymakers such as CMA and ICPAK 
when formulating the codes and when pushing for compliance. This study also provides a source 
of information that the regulators can use as a red flag to detect non-compliant companies. 
Effective regulation will encourage efficiency and strengthen the investors’ belief in the market. 
This study backs up other studies that push for effective regulations.  
5.4.5  To Investors  
This study seeks to guide investors when choosing their investment preference. Considering the 
relationship between corporate governance qualities, audit report lag, earnings quality, investors 
can be able to decide on which companies to invest in, in the NSE. Audit report lag may signify 
poor corporate governance quality. Lack of corporate governance qualities is one of the factors the 




5.5  Areas for further studies 
This study mainly focused on the listed non-financial firms in the NSE. It would be interesting for 
other researchers to focus on all listed firms in the NSE or other stock markets. Furthermore, this 
study only used two methods for data collection, those were the questionnaires and the secondary 
data from the audited report. In order to gain more clarity on the issues of the association between 
audit report lag and earnings quality, other data collection methods such as focused group 
discussions with the preparers of the accounts may be considered. Finally, the study used 
unbalanced panel data due to some missing data, hence, there is an opportunity for future further 
studies to use balanced data and where possible carry out the study in different jurisdictions. This 
will enable those future studies to observe any changes as a result of the change in the regulatory 
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APPENDIX II: Research questionnaire 
 
My name is Mercy A. Nyangweso. Iam currently a Master of Commerce Student at Strathmore 
University. Iam conducting a research on “The mediating effect of corporate governance 
quality on the association between audit report lag and earnings quality”. At this point of my 
data collection, Iam concerned with collecting data from accounting practitioners in the listed 
companies. The objectives of this study are to first, determine the association between audit report 
lag and earnings quality, then, determine the mediating effect of corporate governance quality on 
the association between audit report lag and earnings quality, finally to obtain views from preparers 
and auditors of the annual reports of listed companies on the association between earnings quality 
and, corporate governance quality and audit report lag. Therefore, your contribution will go a long 
way in achieving the objectives of the study. I am grateful in advance for sparing some time to fill 
in this questionnaire and I assure you that all the information provided for this study will be treated 
with confidentiality and will be used solely for this research. For any queries you may contact me 
on matieno@strathmore.edu or on +2540710394800. 
SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION  
Information provided in this section will be used as background data to the information to be 
provided in the other sections. 
1. Kindly tick against your Gender  male  ( )  Female   (   ) 
2.  Kindly indicate your main occupation? 
Finance manage (   ) accountant  (   ) Internal auditor () External auditor  (   ) 
Others (please specify) ………………………………….. 
3. Years of experience in your profession  
Less than one year (  )  between 1- less than 5years (  )   between5 years to less than 10 
years (  ) 
Between 10 years to less that 15years (  )  Over 15 years (  ) 
4. professional accounting qualification,   ACCA ( )  CPA (   ) CFA (  ) 
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Others please specify ……………………… 
 
5. In your opinion, what is the average time the external auditors take to complete the audit? 
Less than one year (  )  between 1- less than 5years (  )   between 5 years to less than 
10 years (  ) between 10 years to less that 15years (  )  Over 15 years (  )  
        Others (please specify) ………………………………………………. 
 
SECTION B: INDICATORS OF QUALITY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The purpose of this section is to establish stakeholder’s views on how corporate governance quality 
mediates the association between earnings quality and audit report lag. Please indicate the extent 
to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking the cell that corresponds 
to your choice. 
EFFECTS ON AUDIT REPORT 
LAG  
1 2 3 4 5 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 When management ownership is 
less than 5% this reduces  audit 
report lag  
     
2 Presence of board of directors 
reduces audit report lag 
     
3 When the board has more than 10 
members in a year the audit report 
lag reduces  
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4 When the board has more than 
ten(10) meetings in a year then the 
audit report lag reduces  
     
5 When board members are trained 
the audit report lag reduces  
     
6 When the number of independent 
directors is more than ten (10) this 
reduces the audit report lag 
     
7 Lack of CEO duality reduces the 
audit report lag 
     
8 Presence of an audit committee 
reduces the audit report lag  
     
9 Presence of an independent 
member of the audit committee 
increases the earnings quality. 
     
10 When an audit committee has more 
than five members this reduces the 
audit report lag  
     
11 When the audit committee holds 
more than ten meetings in a year 
this reduces the audit report lag  
     
12 When the AC members have 
relevant qualification, this reduces 
the audit report lag  
     
13 When a compensation committee 
exists the audit report lag reduces  
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14 When the CEO is not a member of 
the compensation committee audit 
report lag reduces  
     
15 When there is Gender diversity in 
the board (management committee) 
then the audit report lag reduces  
     
16 When there is Gender diversity in 
the board (audit committee) then 
the audit report lag reduces 
     
17 When Board election are held 
annually the audit report lag 
reduces  
     
18 When there is Presence of other 
committees other than audit 
committee, management 
committee, compensation 
committee, the audit report lag 
reduces  
     
19 When management ownership is 
less than 5% this reduces the 
earnings quality   
     
20 Presence of board of directors 
increases the earnings  
     
21 When the board has more than 10 
ten members the earnings quality  
increases  
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22 When the board has more than 
ten(10) meetings in a year then the 
earnings quality  increases 
     
23 When board members are trained 
the earnings quality  increases 
     
24 When the number of independent 
directors is more than ten (10) this 
increases the earnings quality  
     
25 Lack of  CEO duality increases the 
earnings quality  
     
26 Presence of an audit committee 
increases the earnings quality   
     
27 Presence of an independent 
member of the audit committee 
increases the earnings quality. 
     
28 When an audit committee has more 
than five members this increases 
the earnings quality   
     
29 When the audit committee holds 
more than ten meetings in a year 
this increases the earnings quality   
     
30 When the AC members have 
relevant qualification, this 
increases the earnings quality   
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31 When a compensation committee 
exists the earnings quality  
increases 
     
32 When there is Gender diversity in 
the board (management committee) 
then the earnings quality  increases 
     
33 When there is Gender diversity in 
the board (audit committee) then 
the earnings quality  increases 
     
34 When Board election are held 
annually the earnings quality  
increases 
     
35 When there is Presence of other 
committees other than audit 
committee,management,committee
,compensation committee, the 
earnings quality  increases 
     
36 Auditors take longer to sign the 
audit report when they have 
difficulties with the management? 
     
37 When the financial statements need 
many adjustments, auditors take 
longer to sign the audit report.  
     
38 When the company has reported a 
profit with a negative cash position, 
auditors take longer to sign the 
audit report 
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39 The more the board members in a 
company, the longer it takes 
auditors to release the audit report.   
     
40 The more experienced the audit 
committee members are, the shorter 
it takes auditors to complete their 
audit.  
     
41 The presence of a relatively 
independent internal audit 
department, the shorter it takes 
external auditors to release their 
report.  
     
42 The more the CEO is involved in 
the audit, the longer it takes auditors 
to release their report.  
     
43 Better governed companies take 
shorter to get their audit completed.  
     
44 When companies report an 
operating loss with a positive cash 
flow position, auditors take shorter 
to complete their audit.   
     
45 When a company reports a negative 
cash flow from operations, auditors 
take longer to complete their audit. 
     
 
Adapted from (David M. Mathuva et al., 2017; Zitouni, 2016b) 
Thank you for taking your time to fill this questionnaire   
74 
 
APPENDIX III: Sampled Companies 
  SAMPLED COMPANY  
1 Mumias 
2 Kapchorua Tea Co. 
3 Kakuzi 
4 Limuru Tea Co. Ltd 
5 BAT 
6 Sasini Ltd  
7  Williamson Tea Kenya  
8  Car and General (K) 
9  Sameer Africa Ltd  
10 Express Ltd 
11 Kenya Airways Ltd 
12 Nation Media Group 
13 Standard Group Ltd 
14 TPS Eastern Africa (Serena) 
15 Scangroup Ltd 
16 EABL 
17 Athi River Mining 
18 Bamburi Cement Ltd 
19 Crown Berger Ltd 
20 E.A.Cables Ltd 
21 E.A.Portland Cement Ltd 
22 KenolKobil Ltd 
23 Total Kenya Ltd 
24 Kengen Ltd 






APPENDIX IV: NSE listed companies 
 COMPANY   COMPANY 
 AGRICULTURAL 
 
COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 
1 Eaagads Ltd. 23 Express Ltd Kenya. 
2 Kapchorua Tea Co. Ltd. 24 Kenya Airways Ltd. 
3 Kakuzi Ltd. 25 Nation Media Group Ltd. 
4 Limuru Tea Co. Ltd  26 Standard Group Ltd. 
5  Rea Vipingo Plantations  Ltd. 27 TPS Eastern Africa Ltd. 
6 Sasini Ltd. 28 Scangroup Ltd. 
7  Williamson Tea Kenya Ltd. 29 Uchumi Supermarket. 
 AUTOMOBILES AND ACCESSORIES 30 Hutchings Biemer Ltd  
8  Car and General (K) Ltd. 31 Longhorn Kenya Ltd. 
9  Sameer Africa Ltd.  32 Atlas African Industries Ltd. 
10  Marshalls (E.A.) Ltd. 33 Nairobi Business Ventures Ltd 
  BANKING   CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 
11  Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd.  34 Athi River Mining Cement Ltd. 
12  CFC Stanbic of Kenya Holdings Ltd. 35 Bamburi Cement Ltd. 
13  I&M Holdings Ltd.  36 Crown Paints Kenya Ltd. 
14  Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd. 37 E.A.Cables Ltd. 
15  Housing Finance Co. Kenya Ltd.   38 E.A.Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
16  Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd.  ENERGY AND PETROLEUM 
17  National Bank of Kenya Ltd. 39 KenolKobil Ltd. 
18 NIC Bank Ltd. 40 Total Kenya Ltd. 
19 Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd. 41 KenGenCo.Ltd. 
20 Equity Bank Ltd.  42 Kenya Power & Lighting Co Ltd. 
21 The Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd. 43 Umeme Ltd. 
 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT  TELECOMMUNICATION 
22 StanlibFahari I-REIT 44 SafaricomLtd. 
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 INSURANCE  INVESTMENT SERVICES 
45 Jubilee Holdings Ltd.  56 Nairobi Securities Exchange Ltd. 
46 Pan Africa Insurance Holdings Ltd.  MANUFACTURING AND ALLIED 
47 Kenya Re-Insurance Corporation Ltd. 57 A.Bauman and Co. Ltd 
48 Liberty Kenya Holdings Ltd. 58 B.O.C Knya Ltd. 
49 British American Investment Co.Kenya. 59 British American Tobacco Kenya Ltd. 
50 CIC Insurance Group Ltd. 60 Carbacid Investment Ltd. 
 INVESTMENT 61 Eveready East Africa Ltd. 
51 Centum Investment Co Ltd. 62 Lame Tree Group. 
52 Trans-Century Ltd. 63 Kenya Orchards Ltd. 
53 Home Afrika Ltd. 64 Mumias Sugar co. Ltd. 
54 Kurwitu Ventures Ltd. 65 Unga Group Co. Ltd 











APPENDIX V: Data collection sheet for audit report lag 
  SAMPLED COMPANY  
Year of 






No of days ( 
audit report 
lag ) 
1 Mumias     
2 Kapchorua Tea Co.     
3 Kakuzi     
4 Limuru Tea Co. Ltd     
5 BAT     
6 Sasini Ltd      
7  Williamson Tea Kenya      
8  Car and General (K)     
9  Sameer Africa Ltd      
10 Express Ltd     
11 Kenya Airways Ltd     
12 Nation Media Group     
13 Standard Group Ltd     
14 TPS Eastern Africa (Serena)     
15 Scangroup Ltd     
16 EABL     
17 Athi River Mining     
18 Bamburi Cement Ltd     
19 Crown Berger Ltd     
20 E.A.Cables Ltd     
21 E.A.Portland Cement Ltd     
22 KenolKobil Ltd     
23 Total Kenya Ltd     
24 Kengen Ltd     
25 Kenya Power & Lighting Co Ltd     
26 Unga     
27 Everready     
28 Safaricom     
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APPENDIX VI:  Corporate governance quality index   
 
No Description Criteria Score Criteria Score 
1 Management ownership > 5%  1 <5% 0 
2 Presence of board of directors Yes 1 No 0 
3 Size of board of directors > 5 1 < 5 0 
4 Number of  board meetings in a year  > 10 1 <10 0 
5 Training of board members Yes  1 No 0 
6 Number of independent directors > 10 1 <10 0 
7 CEO duality  Yes 1 No 0 
8 
Percentage of independent members of the 
audit committee 
Yes 1 No 0 
9 Presence of audit committee Yes 1 No 0 
10 Size of audit committee  > 5 1 >5 0 
11 Number of audit committee meetings per year > 10 1 > 10 0 
12 Relevant qualification of AC members Yes 1 No 0 
13 Presence of compensation committee  Yes 1 No 0 
14 CEO member of compensation committee Yes 1 No 0 
15 














> 1/3 of 
total 
0 








Presence of committees other than Nos. 2, 9 
and 13 
Yes 1 No 0 
 
Source: The code of corporate practices for issuers of securities for the public 2015,  Mathuva, 











APPENDIX VI1I: Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual Dependent 














APPENDIX IX: Histogram Dependent variable: audit report lag 
 
  
